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SUMMARY TABLE 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Output (Real Annual Growth %)      
Private Consumer Expenditure 4.2 3.3 1.9 2.4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.5 
Public Net Current Expenditure 1.8 5.3 1.8 2.5 3.0 
Investment 27.9 61.2 -22.3 13.0 13.4 
Exports 38.4 4.6 6.9 5.4 5.2 
Imports 26.0 16.4 -6.2 7.0 7.7 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 25.6 5.1 7.8 4.7 3.9 
Gross National Product (GNP) 16.4 9.6 5.2 5.3 3.9 
      
Prices (Annual Growth %)      
Consumer Price Index (CPI) -0.3 0.0 0.4 0.7 1.1 
Growth in Average Hourly Earnings 1.4 1.7 2.0 2.9 3.6 
      
Labour Market      
Employment Levels (ILO basis (‘000)) 2,058 2,133 2,195 2,248 2,286 
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (‘000)) 226 195 158 134 120 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 10.0 8.4 6.7 5.6 5.0 
      
Public Finance      
General Government Balance (€bn) -5.0 -1.4 -1.0 -0.8 0.2 
General Government Balance (% of GDP) -1.9 -0.7 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 
General Government Debt (% of GDP) 76.9 72.8 68.0 66.6 64.0 
      
External Trade      
Balance of Payments Current Account (€bn) 28.6 9.2 37.1 30.9 25.7 
Current Account (% of GNP) 13.9 4.1 15.4 12.2 9.5 
 
Note:  Detailed forecast tables are contained in an Appendix to this Commentary. 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2017 
A: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
 
2016 2017 Change in 2017 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 96.6 99.7 3.2 1.3 1.9 
Public Net Current Expenditure 28.4 29.5 4.2 2.3 1.8 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 87.7 69.4 -20.8 1.8 -22.3 
Exports of Goods and Services 335.0 355.4 6.1 -0.8 6.9 
Physical Changes in Stocks 2.4 2.4 
   
Final Demand 550.1 556.5 1.2 -0.1 1.2 
less: 
     
Imports of Goods and Services  274.4 260.3 -5.2  1.1 -6.2 
Statistical Discrepancy -0.1 -0.1 
   
GDP at Market Prices 275.6 296.2 7.5 -0.3 7.8 
Net Factor Payments  -48.8 -55.0 
   
GNP at Market Prices 226.7 241.2 6.4 -0.2 6.6 
 
B: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ORIGIN 
 
2016 2017 Change in 2017 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.2 3.3 0.1 2.0 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 80.3 84.4 4.2 5.2 
Other 109.1 121.6 12.6 11.5 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.4 0.4 
  
Statistical Discrepancy 0.1 0.1 
  
Net Domestic Product 193.0 209.8 16.8 8.7 
Net Factor Payments -48.8 -55.0 -6.1 12.6 
National Income 144.2 154.9 10.7 7.4 
Depreciation 62.9 65.5 2.6 4.2 
GNP at Factor Cost 207.1 220.4 13.3 6.4 
Taxes less Subsidies 19.7 20.8 1.1 5.7 
GNP at Market Prices 226.7 241.2 14.4 6.4 
 
C: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
  
 
2016 2017 Change in 2017 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 60.8 95.2 34.5 
F -47.6 -53.8 -6.1 
Net Transfers -3.8 -4.3 -0.5   
Balance on Current Account 9.2 37.1 27.9 
as % of GNP 4.1 15.4 11.6 
i v  |  Q uar t er ly  Eco nom ic  C omme nt ary  –  S um me r 2 01 8  
NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2018 
A: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
 
2017 2018 Change in 2018 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 99.7 103.1 3.4 1.0 2.4 
Public Net Current Expenditure 29.5 30.6 3.5 1.0 2.5 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 69.4 82.4 18.7 5.1 13.0 
Exports of Goods and Services 355.4 378.6 6.5 1.1 5.4 
Physical Changes in Stocks 2.4 3.0 
   
Final Demand 556.5 597.8 7.4 1.7 5.6 
less: 
     
Imports of Goods and Services  260.3 287.7 10.6 3.3 7.0 
Statistical Discrepancy -0.1 -0.1 
   
GDP at Market Prices 296.2 310.0 4.7 -0.1 4.7 
Net Factor Payments  -55.0 -56.3    
GNP at Market Prices 241.2 253.7 5.2 -0.1 5.3 
 
B: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ORIGIN 
 
2017 2018 Change in 2018 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.3 3.4 0.1 2.5 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 84.4 88.9 4.5 5.3 
Other 121.6 127.5 5.8 4.8 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.4 0.4 
 
 
Statistical Discrepancy 0.1 0.1   
Net Domestic Product 209.8 220.2 10.4 5.0 
Net Factor Payments -55.0 -56.3 -1.3 2.4 
National Income 154.9 164.0 9.1 5.9 
Depreciation 65.5 68.1 2.6 3.9 
GNP at Factor Cost 220.4 232.0 11.6 5.3 
Taxes less Subsidies 20.8 21.6 0.8 4.0 
GNP at Market Prices 241.2 253.7 12.5 5.2 
 
C: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
2017 2018 Change in 2018 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 95.2 90.7 -4.4 
F -53.8 -55.1 -1.3 
Net Transfers -4.3 -4.8 -0.5   
Balance on Current Account 37.1 30.8 -6.2 
as % of GNP 15.4 12.2 -2.5 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2019 
A: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
 
2018 2019 Change in 2019 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 103.1 106.8 3.5 1.0 2.5 
Public Net Current Expenditure 30.6 31.8 4.1 1.0 3.0 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 82.4 97.3 18.1 4.2 13.4 
Exports of Goods and Services 378.6 405.5 7.1 1.8 5.2 
Physical Changes in Stocks 3.0 3.0 
   
Final Demand 597.8 644.5 7.8 2.0 5.7 
less:       
Imports of Goods and Services  287.7 317.2 10.2 2.4 7.7 
Statistical Discrepancy -0.1 -0.1 
   
GDP at Market Prices 309.9 327.2 5.6 1.6 3.9 
Net Factor Payments  -56.3 -58.4    
GNP at Market Prices 253.7 268.8 6.0 2.0 3.9 
 
B: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ORIGIN 
 
2018 2019 Change in 2019 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.4 3.4 0.0 1.4 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 88.9 93.7 4.8 5.4 
Other 127.5 136.7 9.2 7.2 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.4 0.4   
Statistical Discrepancy 0.1 0.1   
Net Domestic Product 220.2 234.3 14.1 6.4 
Net Factor Payments -56.3 -58.4 -2.1 3.8 
National Income 164.0 175.9 11.9 7.3 
Depreciation 68.1 70.5 2.5 3.6 
GNP at Factor Cost 232.0 246.4 14.4 6.2 
Taxes less Subsidies 21.6 22.4 0.7 3.4 
GNP at Market Prices 253.7 268.8 15.1 6.0 
 
C: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
2018 2019 Change in 2019 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 90.7 88.1 -2.6 
F -55.1 -57.1 -2.1 
Net Transfers -4.8 -5.3 -0.5   
Balance on Current Account 30.8 25.7 -5.2 
as % of GNP 12.2 9.5 -1.9 
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The Irish Economy – Forecast Overview 
 
With both domestic and external sources of growth registering significant 
increases, the Irish economy is on course to experience another robust 
performance in 2018. While the rate of decline in unemployment has slowed 
marginally over the past six months, the underlying trends in taxation receipts 
and overall consumer and producer sentiment indicate strong growth in 2018 and 
2019. Unemployment is still set to fall below 5 per cent in 2019 with employment 
likely to exceed 2.3 million in the same year – some 70,000 more people 
employed than at the peak of the Celtic Tiger period in Q4 2007. 
 
As the budgetary process commences, it is evident the Government has greater 
discretion in terms of fiscal policy than in previous years. In order to ensure 
sustainable growth over the medium term, the main challenge is to use these 
extra resources to address some of the infrastructural deficits which emerged in 
the post-2008 period without overheating a rapidly growing economy. 
 
To provide some perspective on this crucial policy challenge, in a Box to the 
Commentary, Garcia-Rodriquez examines the implications for key Irish 
macroeconomic variables of two fiscal scenarios; one which increases 
Government capital expenditure and another which reduces personal taxation 
rates. Both scenarios cost the same in terms of the implications for the 
Exchequer, however they have different impacts for key variables. Overall, the 
analysis indicates that while economic activity is increased in both cases, the 
increase in capital expenditure is likely to result in an increase in potential output, 
whereas a reduction in taxation rates will stimulate consumption levels.  
 
Given the importance of financial cycle developments in the Irish context, we also 
pay particular attention to the level of credit in the domestic economy. An 
increasing literature now suggests that both credit and fiscal policy need to be 
considered in conjunction with each other when evaluating the degree of 
overheating in an economy. At present, new mortgage lending is rapidly 
increasing in Ireland following the crisis-related downturn. While this does not 
yet appear to be unsustainable, the high growth in house prices, coupled with 
rising average loan sizes, suggest that credit levels are set to continue to increase. 
 
While developments in the international economy are expected to contribute 
positively to Irish growth, a number of external risks are apparent. Growing 
political uncertainty in Italy, the exact nature of Brexit and the possibility of 
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international trade wars could all have an adverse impact on global activity. The 
Irish economy, given its highly open nature, is especially vulnerable to these 
developments. 
 
Finally, in another Special Article to the Commentary, Fitzgerald (2018) discusses 
the complications for the Irish National Accounts of the increasingly globalised 
economy. The paper focuses, in particular, on the challenges posed by the 
treatment of intellectual capital in national accounting frameworks. Fitzgerald 
(2018) notes that recent US tax changes could lead to further, significant 
international movements of intellectual property related assets, with countries 
such as Ireland potentially impacted. 
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The International Economy 
 
Global economic activity is expected to grow strongly according to the IMF’s most 
recent economic outlook report.1 In particular, growth in both the US and Asia 
surpassed expectations for the first quarter of 2018. In comparison, Europe has 
experienced a minor downturn in growth for the first quarter. Risks to the global 
outlook include increased geopolitical tensions and a notable trend towards 
protectionist policies. Given that much of recent global growth is attributed to 
increased levels of trade and foreign investment, an increase in protectionism 
could see global growth rates falling short of the expected 3.9 per cent increase 
in 2018 and 2019.  
 
The Euro Area shows initial signs of a slight slowdown in Q1 2018; this is reflected 
in soft indicators such as consumer sentiment and industrial production which 
are not growing as strongly as the same period last year. Annual GDP growth 
rates in Q1 2018 in Germany, France and the Netherlands fell to 1.6, 1.9 and 2.8 
per cent respectively, supporting the view that the region may be experiencing a 
minor slowdown in economic activity. Although developments in the labour 
market performance and consumer sentiment still indicate growth in 2018, the 
increased risks of US trade tariffs and the recent bout of adverse weather across 
the continent appear to have contributed towards a slight downturn in activity. 
As of March 2018, unemployment has fallen to 8.5 per cent for the Euro Area 
with rates ranging from lows of 2.2 per cent in the Czech Republic to highs of 20.8 
per cent in Greece. 
 
The ECB continues its asset purchasing programme, and aims to do so until 
inflation approaches target rates. Inflation in the European Union fell to 1.5 per 
cent in Q1 2018, having risen by 1.8 per cent for Q1 2017. While an unwinding of 
the extraordinary monetary policy measures of the ECB is set to commence quite 
soon, policy rates are unlikely to increase in the short term. Some commentators, 
such as Wren-Lewis (2018),2 suggest that monetary policy may have reached its 
limit in terms of inducing inflationary pressure and that of fiscal policy should be 
used instead. However, the consensus concerning the need for governments to 
achieve balanced budgets means fiscal policy is unlikely to be used in such a 
manner. FocusEconomics’ consensus forecast for the Euro Area estimates GDP 
growth of 2.3 and 2.0 per cent for 2018 and 2019, respectively. 
 
 
                                                          
 
1  IMF, World Economic Outlook Update, April 2018. 
2  Wren-Lewis, S. (2018). ‘Fiscal policy remains in the Stone Age’, https://mainlymacro.blogspot.ie/2018/05/fiscal-
policy-remains-in-stone-age.html. 
4 |  Qu ar te r l y  Econo mic  Co mme nt ary  –  S um me r 2 01 8   
In Q1 2018, UK GDP grew by 0.1 per cent on a quarterly basis. Downward trends 
in UK GDP growth are likely to persist for the year. Both NIESR and the IMF have 
revised downwards their forecasts, with 2018 annual growth expected to reach 
between 1.4 to 1.5 per cent. This is after 1.8 per cent growth in 2017. 
 
As can be seen in Figure 1, UK inflation rates are closely correlated with changes 
in the Euro to Pound Sterling exchange rates. UK inflation has subsided marginally 
in Q1 2018 to 2.7 per cent, coinciding with a moderate appreciation in the Pound. 
August is likely to see an increase in the Bank of England’s official interest rate in 
order to supress inflationary pressures further.  
 
The UK unemployment rate fell to 4.2 per cent in Q1 2018. However, decreases in 
average weekly hours worked per employee indicate the rise in employment may 
not be as significant as movements in headline unemployment rates suggest. 
Between 2000 and 2014, 0.8 per cent of employees worked on zero-hour 
contracts. In recent years, this share has risen to 2.8 per cent of employment 
(from 225,000 individuals to 901,000) as of June 2017. The increasing prominence 
of zero-hour contracts as a form of employment coupled with declines in average 
weekly hours worked suggest recent reductions in the unemployment rate may 
be hiding a decreased level of job quality in the UK’s labour market.3  
 
FIGURE 1 QUARTERLY INFLATION AND EUR-GBP EXCHANGE RATE, Q1 2005 – Q1 2018 
 
 
Source:  Eurostat and ONS databases. 
 
 
                                                          
 
3  ONS (2018). ‘Contracts that do not guarantee a minimum number of hours: April 2018’. 
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US growth rates surpassed expectations in Q1 2018, yielding an annualised real 
GDP growth rate of 2.3 per cent. Personal consumption of goods saw a 
contraction (-0.24 percentage point contribution to growth), though increased 
levels of investment and government spending more than compensated for this. 
As of April 2018, the US unemployment rate declined to 3.9 per cent. Various 
measures of inflation suggest the US economy is approaching the 2 per cent 
target rate of the Federal Reserve,4 while the Reserve has publically stated 
inflation shows no signs of ‘running away’. The official interest rate was increased 
to 1.75 per cent as of March 2018. The Congressional Budget Office recently 
raised forecasts of US debt, increasing to 110.4 per cent of GDP by 2022 following 
the introduction of major tax reforms in 2018. 
 
An ageing population and thus shrinking future labour supply continue to impact 
on the growth potential of the Japanese economy. For the first time in over two 
years, the Japanese economy showed a quarter-on-quarter contraction in GDP of 
0.2 per cent. As of April 2018, annualised inflation stood at 0.6 per cent, 
decreasing further when excluding volatile food and energy prices. Despite 
extensive monetary stimulus by the Bank of Japan, the economy has struggled to 
meet the targeted 2 per cent inflation. Japan’s trade outlook remains strong, 
however, after the lower house passed the newly named ‘Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership’, which is expected to come 
into effect by the end of next year.  
 
China experienced annual growth of 6.8 per cent in Q1 2018. Unemployment in 
China has been revised upwards to 5.1 per cent following the implementation of 
a higher quality of measurement through the use of household surveys. 
Investment growth has moderated as the Chinese government restricts credit 
expansion and shadow banking activity through structural reform in the financial 
sector. Increased trade tensions with the US combined with the current fragility 
of the Chinese financial sector are the outstanding risks to future growth.  
 
More generally, other economies have continued to benefit from improved 
global demand with world trade volumes expected to increase by 5.1 per cent in 
2018. Revisions to the IMF’s global outlook remain positive for Asian economies, 
with growth averaging 6.5 per cent in 2018.  
 
Figure 2 summarises the forecasts for GDP growth produced by the major 
institutions of their respective economies. The outlook overall continues to 
 
                                                          
 
4  Price Indexes for Personal Consumption Expenditures average 1.8 per cent inflation for Q1 2018 while CPI excluding 
food and energy indicates a slightly higher rate of 1.9 per cent growth for Q4 2017. When including food and energy, 
inflation rises to 2.3 per cent though this measure is far less preferable instrument when establishing long-run 
forecasts, given its volatility. Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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remain positive over the next two years, with the majority of experts adding 
upward revisions to forecasts for both the Euro Area and the United States. HM 
Treasury growth projections were revised downwards to a median of 1.5 per cent 
for the UK in 2018. Forecasts for 2019 also remain unchanged at 1.5 per cent.  
 
FIGURE 2 REAL GDP GROWTH (% CHANGE, YEAR-ON-YEAR) 
        Euro Area            United States            United Kingdom 
 
 
Sources:  FocusEconomics, IMF, OECD, HM Treasury and Federal Reserve. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR IRISH EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND THE BALANCE OF 
PAYMENTS 
Goods 
Recent trade of goods data suggest exports have not only grown faster than 
imports in 2017, but that Irish imports have fallen consecutively for three 
quarters relative to the same periods in 2016. In Figure 3, Q4 2017 saw an annual 
growth rate of 10.3 for total Irish exports while imports fell by 1.4 per cent. 
However, the Irish trade outlook is heavily influenced by the manner in which 
foreign-owned Irish resident firms manage their global supply networks. 
However, a different picture emerges when only goods which cross the Irish 
border are considered, hence excluding ownership trade of goods (e.g. contract 
manufacturing, merchanting).5 
 
 
                                                          
 
5  For further details on ownership trade, see CSO’s ‘Explaining Goods Exports and Imports 2012-2016’. 
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FIGURE 3 ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (%) IN TOTAL IRISH EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF GOODS 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Growth in cross-border imports of goods exceeds that of exports, resulting in a 
persistently decreasing trade balance. For example, between March 2017 and 
2018, the trade surplus for cross-border goods fell from €14.2 billion to €13.5 
billion. Figure 4 highlights this recent trend in cross-border goods, where 
consistently greater import growth has led to the deterioration of the trade 
surplus since Q2 2017.  
 
FIGURE 4 ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (%) IN CROSS-BORDER IRISH EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
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In considering Ireland’s trade performance, the Commentary focuses on three 
categories; cross-border goods trade, ownership goods trade and services trade. 
For 2017, cross-border goods represent approximately 35 per cent of total Irish 
exports but this share has been declining in recent years. Services trade 
represents the largest portion of Irish exports at roughly 40-45 per cent. The 
remaining category, ownership goods, captures the exchange of goods outside of 
Ireland’s borders that fall under the ownership of Irish-resident firms. This 
represented 5 per cent of total exports in 2013 before rising sharply to an 
average of 23 per cent over the last three years. Sixty-five per cent of imports are 
service-based. Imports of cross-border goods represent another 30 per cent of 
the total amount. Figure 5 compares trade balances including and excluding 
ownership trade. Given that ownership only plays a significant role in exports, 
major headline figures for the Irish trade balance appear heavily inflated relative 
to actual domestic activity.  
 
FIGURE 5 CROSS-BORDER AND ADJUSTED NET EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES (€ MILLION) 
  
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office, QEC calculations. 
Note: Adjustments to net exports account for ownership trade of goods. This includes, but is not limited to, forms of goods for 
processing, such as contract manufacturing, and merchanting, i.e. the purchase and resale of goods which do not enter the 
merchant’s economy.  
 
 
Services 
Separating ownership trade from total goods helps explain the strong growth in 
exports, however it does not provide as much insight into the 5.1 per cent fall in 
imports of goods and services in 2017. Relative to 2016, service imports fell by 6.9 
per cent during 2017. Given that almost 70 per cent of total Irish imports are 
based on the purchase of these foreign services, even marginal declines can have 
a significantly positive effect on the trade surplus. This explains the majority of 
the increase in Ireland’s trade surplus, as reflected by Figure 6. In Q4 2017, the 
trade surplus was increased by €10 billion due to the services trade.  
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FIGURE 6 ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (%) IN TOTAL IRISH EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Focusing on the components of cross border trade for Q1 2018, exports increased 
year-on-year by €1.4 billion (4.3 per cent). Exports of chemicals and related 
products contributed the most towards the trade surplus, rising by €3.8 billion 
(21.7 per cent). Exports of machinery and transport equipment experienced the 
largest decline, falling by €2.5 billion (39.2 per cent). Relative to Q1 2017, goods 
imports rose annually by €0.7 billion (3.7 per cent). Medicinal and pharmaceutical 
products rose by €1.1 billion (63.3 per cent). A decline in machinery and transport 
equipment contributed towards a €0.5 billion decrease in imports (6.6 per cent) 
between the same periods.  
 
Thirty per cent of total Irish goods exports went to the US in Q1 2018. Belgium’s 
13.8 per cent share of Irish exports, driven primarily by organic chemical 
products, has overtaken the UK’s share which fell to 11.4 per cent. Enterprise 
Ireland (2017) highlights Belgium’s status as a hub for the processing of 
intermediate goods, which are likely behind this increased share.6 The UK 
remains Ireland’s primary source of imports, representing almost a quarter of 
total goods imports between January and March. In terms of flows, imports of 
goods from the UK rose by 8 per cent, likely fuelled by the recent weakness of the 
Pound Sterling. In a previous Commentary, Lawless and Morgenroth (2018) 
quantify the risks of such a high concentration of UK imports on Irish household 
expenditure, should major tariffs come into effect following Brexit.7 The share of 
goods imports from the rest of the world decreased slightly from 39.2 per cent in 
Q1 2017 to 38.6 per cent the following year.  
 
                                                          
 
6  Enterprise Ireland (2017). ‘Going Global, Exporting to Belgium & Luxembourg, Guide for Clients’. 
7  Lawless, M. and E. Morgenroth (2018). ‘Brexit and Irish Consumers’, Quarterly Economic Commentary, Spring 2018. 
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Computer services accounted for almost half of Irish service exports in 2017, an 
annual increase of 15.1 per cent. Recent strong growth in ICT sector employment 
levels suggests this trend is likely to persist throughout 2018. Regarding service 
imports, royalties, licenses and business services formed 83 per cent of services 
imports in 2017. Royalties/licenses fell annually by 1.4 per cent while business 
service imports decreased by 16.1 per cent. Among the different categories of 
business services, research and development experienced the largest decrease, 
falling by 43.1 per cent in 2017 (from €47.1 billion to €26.8 billion). Figure 5 
illustrates how both exports and imports in the services industry have doubled 
since 2012. 
  
FIGURE 7 EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF SERVICES (€ MILLION) 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Table 1 highlights how annual changes in these exports and imports between 
regions remain relatively stable. In terms of trade with the UK, exports of 
chemicals and related products saw a 12 per cent fall compared to the same 
period last year. Trade in machinery with European countries experienced a 
major fall in both exports and imports, at 28 and 29 per cent respectively. Overall 
trade with the US remained relatively fixed, however major compositional 
changes occurred within Irish-US trade. For example, the export of food and live 
animals fell by just under 50 per cent.  
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TABLE 1 JANUARY-MARCH ANNUAL CHANGE (%) IN GOODS EXPORTS AND IMPORTS FOR THE 
UK, THE US AND THE REST OF EU FOR MAJOR COMMODITIES 
 Exports Imports 
Total – UK 2 8 
 Food and live animals 4 4 
 Chemicals and related products 12 3 
 Machinery and transport equipment -20 8 
 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 9 0 
   
Total – Rest of EU 7 3 
 Food and live animals 8 5 
 Chemicals and related products 18 74 
 Machinery and transport equipment -28 -29 
 Miscellaneous manufactured articles -2 -3 
   
Total – US 0 -1 
 Food and live animals -49 35 
 Chemicals and related products 24 -17 
 Machinery and transport equipment -60 10 
 Miscellaneous manufactured articles -1 0 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
To summarise, annualised growth rates varied significantly across various trade 
categories. In Q1 2018, cross-border trade exports and imports increased by 2.2 
and 7.8 per cent respectively. As of Q4 2017, exports of ownership trade 
increased by 9.3 per cent while imports decreased by 50.1 per cent. The net 
import of services shrank due to exports increasing by 15.9 per cent in tandem 
with imports decreasing by 11.6 per cent.  
 
Due to the recently volatile nature of ownership trade in goods as well as 
services, forecasts in the Commentary continue to be based upon trends in trade 
patterns linked to underlying Irish economic activity. In Figure 8, our 2018 export 
forecast has been adjusted to 5.4 per cent growth while imports are forecast to 
grow by 7.0 per cent. For 2019, exports and imports are expected to grow by 5.2 
and 7.7 per cent respectively. A reduced trade balance has been forecast in 2019 
due to expectations of strong growth rates in private consumption, which will 
likely result in continued increases in demand for imported goods and services.  
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FIGURE 8 IMPORT AND EXPORT GROWTH (2017-2019 FORECASTS) 
 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
 
Current Account 
The current account balance combines trade balances with international net 
income flows. In Ireland’s case, outflows of income generally moderate the major 
trade surpluses arising from positive net exports. Figure 9 decomposes the 
current account into goods, services, primary and secondary income. Compared 
to 2016, the current account as a percentage of gross domestic product has 
almost quadrupled in size. This increase in the current account balance is 
primarily the result of an improvement in goods trade persisting since 2015. 
Primary income – income from loans and investments – has maintained large 
outflows over the past three years but grew only slightly in 2017.  
 
FIGURE 9 CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE, ANNUAL (€ MILLION) 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
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Similar to the sudden increase in the trade surplus of goods, net outflows of 
primary income have been at record levels for the past three years. The main 
determinant of primary income outflows is income on equity which itself is a 
combination of net operating surplus and investment income. These retained 
profits are then used either to pay dividends towards shareholders or as a source 
of reinvestment into the enterprise. In 2013 the outflows of equity income 
accounted for €22 billion of primary income’s €27 billion net outflow. As of 2017, 
primary net outflows rose to €53 billion, of which €43 billion was linked to 
income on equity. Figure 10 displays how these outflows of profits were split 
between dividends and reinvested earnings between 2012 and 2017.  
 
FIGURE 10 DIRECT INVESTMENT INCOME ON EQUITY, QUARTERLY (€ MILLION):  
Q1 2012 – Q4 2017 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
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The Domestic Economy 
 
OUTPUT 
The domestic section of the Commentary is organised as follows; we initially 
review the outlook for output growth before discussing developments in the Irish 
monetary and financial sectors. Prices and earnings in the economy are then 
discussed, followed by a review of demand-side factors such as consumption and 
housing market issues. On the supply side, we then examine developments in 
investment and the labour market before concluding with an analysis of the 
public finances. 
 
The likely strong performance of the Irish economy in 2018 is due to both 
domestic and external factors. Consumption and investment, which have both 
been significant determinants of Irish growth over the past few years will 
continue to increase, while the improvement in global economic conditions, 
observed over the past year, will result in increased demand for domestically 
produced goods and services. Recently the CSO, as part of its productivity in 
Ireland series,8 released estimates of labour and multi-factor productivity for the 
Irish economy over the period 2000 to 2016. Importantly, the data are presented 
for ‘foreign-owned multinational enterprise dominated sector’ and for ‘other 
sectors excluding the foreign-owned multinational enterprise dominated sector’. 
In Figure 11, the growth rate in labour productivity for the other sectors is 
presented. 
 
Apart from the 2011 figure, the series suggests a credible rate of productivity 
growth for the Irish economy; in the initial years of the Celtic Tiger, productivity 
rates are quite significant, while the growth rates decline towards the 2007/2008 
period. In the initial phases of the present recovery, productivity rates are quite 
pronounced, as the economy recovers sharply. The heightened productivity 
growth rate for 2011 may be a temporal issue due to the sudden and significant 
increase in unemployment in the Irish labour market at that time. 
 
 
                                                          
 
8  See www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-pii/productivityinireland2016/ for details. 
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FIGURE 11 LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH RATE (%) FOR ‘OTHER SECTORS EXCLUDING THE 
FOREIGN-OWNED MULTINATIONAL DOMINATED SECTOR’ 
 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
 
The previous Commentary called for the preparation of a separate set of National 
Accounts in order to fully understand developments in the domestic economy. 
With the new domestic sector productivity publication from the CSO, it is 
interesting to combine the growth in labour productivity presented above with 
the observed increase in employment in the Irish labour market over the similar 
period (2001-2016). This growth rate ‘Calculated’ is then compared with GDP and 
GNP growth in Figure 12. 
 
FIGURE 12 ALTERNATIVE OUTPUT GROWTH RATES (%) FOR THE IRISH ECONOMY: 2001-2016 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
 
As can be seen from the Figure, the calculated growth rate is more stable than 
both GDP and GNP in the Irish case and as such is more plausible. It suggests the 
economy is experiencing significant growth up to 2016 but not the exceptional 
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rates indicated by the more familiar GDP/GNP concepts. While foreign companies 
do contribute considerably to Irish economic output, in particular through wages 
and salaries and corporation tax payments, company specific strategies for some 
large MNEs distort the productivity figures considerably. The calculations indicate 
the importance of splitting out economic data between the foreign-owned 
multinational enterprise sector and the rest of the economy.  
 
Ideally, productivity estimates for the foreign-owned multinational sector should 
be split between those firms which engage in ‘distortionary’ transactions and the 
rest of the sector. 
 
One issue with using micro-level estimates of productivity to generate macro-
level forecasts is the timeliness issue in terms of availability of such granular 
estimates. Therefore, if we were to forecast the future level of labour 
productivity by assuming that the rate of productivity growth declines marginally 
over the period 2017-2019, we would get the following: 
 
FIGURE 13 ACTUAL AND FORECAST LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH RATE (%) FOR ‘OTHER 
SECTORS EXCLUDING THE FOREIGN-OWNED MULTINATIONAL DOMINATED SECTOR’ 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
 
Combining those forecasts with our forecasts for employment growth in the 
economy over the same period (2018-2019), indicates that the Irish economy 
would grow by 4.6 and 3.7 per cent respectively in 2018 and 2019, which is 
almost exactly in line with our current forecasts of output growth. 
 
The increase in the amount of fiscal space available to the Government for 
Budget 2019 will likely see an array of pressures on the public finance front. To 
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provide some perspective on this, in the following Box by Garcia-Rodriguez, the 
potential implications of two fiscal scenarios are examined using COSMO. 
 
BOX 1  MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN AND POTENTIAL 
ALTERNATIVES 
Introduction 
The recent Stability Programme Update 2018, published in April, set out the 
Government’s intentions to increase public capital investment. This commitment was 
first introduced in the Capital Plan in 2015, which set out a six-year framework for 
investment in Ireland up to 2021. According to the Government, the motivations for this 
increase in public investment are: 
1. To address some of the infrastructural deficits which emerged after the financial 
crisis, when annual general government Gross Fixed Capital Formation fell from a 
peak of €9.7 billion in 2007 to €3.5 billion in 2012; and 
2. To equip Ireland with the necessary tools to face potential challenges related to 
demographic change, regional imbalances or climate change. 
More recently, the Capital Plan has been updated and upgraded with the publication of 
the National Development Plan (NDP) 2018-2027. Over the period, an estimated €116 
billion is proposed in total investment. In addition, the NDP introduces a large expansion 
of the initial commitments of the Capital Plan, as the expected total increase in public 
investment for the 2018-2021 period is around 40 per cent greater than what was 
initially projected under the Capital Plan in 2015.  
FIGURE A  PUBLIC INVESTMENT ON THE BASELINE AND PROJECTED ON THE NATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT PLAN (€ MILLION) 
 
Given these significant fiscal commitments over the medium term, it is informative to 
quantify the impact of alternative uses of public funds at this point. In particular, the  
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recent improvement in the fiscal accounts has led some commentators to argue for 
reductions in personal taxation rates. As some households are still recovering from the 
post-2007/2008 downturn, it has been suggested reductions in personal taxation rates 
could consolidate the economic recovery. 
It is particularly appropriate to compare the contrasting impact of these fiscal scenarios 
at a time when the economy is growing strongly and concerns have been raised as to the 
possibility of ‘overheating’ or unsustainable growth emerging.9 Therefore, using the 
macroeconometric model, COSMO, we project the effects on key economic variables of 
the following scenarios: 
1. The application of the NDP; and 
2. A reduction in income tax rates. 
The results are quantified relative to a baseline level. Importantly, the income tax 
reduction is modelled such that the impact on the public finances, in terms of the 
aggregated Government balance over the period 2018-2027, is comparable to that of the 
NDP scenario. To examine the implications for the public finances, we also examine the 
combination of both scenarios. 
Methodology 
This exercise will therefore compare the macroeconomic effects of the public investment 
increase with those of a reduction in income tax. The public investment increase will be 
modelled by substituting the path of investment in the original COSMO baseline 
presented in the Economic Outlook10 with the path described in the NDP. Both paths can 
be observed in Figure A. As we can see, with respect to the baseline, the NDP scenario 
results in an acceleration of projected investment at the beginning of the period, 
particularly during 2019, and a return to the previous projected growth rate after 2021. 
For simplicity, we assume that the income tax rate is reduced in 2018 and kept constant 
during the period of the analysis. 
One complication is that as the tax cut impacts economic activity and, in particular, the 
tax base associated with disposable income, its impact on the government balance can 
only be assessed after the simulation. To make both shocks comparable, then, we must 
proceed sequentially, re-running the exercise and adjusting the size of the tax cut until 
we obtain an impact on the public finances for the income tax shock which is similar to 
that of the public investment increase. After performing this exercise, we conclude that a 
reduction of the average effective income tax rate of 1.2 percentage points between 
2018 and 2027 will produce the same impact on the government balance comparable to 
the investment path projected in the NDP. 
 
 
                                                          
 
9  See www.oecd.org/eco/outlook/economic-forecast-summary-ireland-oecd-economic-outlook.pdf for example. 
10  See Bergin, Adele, Abian Garcia-Rodriguez, Niall Mc Inerney, Edgar Morgenroth (2016). ‘Chapter 1: Baseline: 
Methodology, Assumptions and Projections’, in Ireland’s Economic Outlook: Perspectives and Policy Challenges; 
Bergin, Adele, Edgar Morgenroth, Kieran McQuinn (eds.). ESRI Forecasting Series. 
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TABLE A  DEVIATIONS FROM BASELINE FOR THE PUBLIC INVESTMENT INCREASE AND THE 
INCOME TAX CUT SCENARIOS 
 Public Investment Increase Income Tax Cut 
Percentage deviation from 
Baseline Level, Average: 
2018-
2022 
2023-
2027 Average 
2018-
2022 
2023-
2027 Average 
Gross Domestic Product  
at Basic Prices 0.7 1.4 1.1 0.3 1.0 0.7 
Potential Output 0.5 1.7 1.1 0.3 0.9 0.6 
Gross Value Added  
at Basic Prices, Trade Sector 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.4 
Gross Value Added at Basic 
Prices, Non-Traded Sector 0.7 2.1 1.4 0.7 1.7 1.2 
Total Investment 1.6 4.7 3.2 0.9 2.7 1.8 
Personal Consumption  
of Goods and Services 0.6 1.3 0.9 1.0 1.6 1.3 
Employed Persons 0.8 1.8 1.3 0.5 1.1 0.8 
Disposable Income 0.7 1.4 1.0 1.2 1.8 1.5 
Exports 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.5 
Deviations from Baseline, 
Average 
2018-
2022 
2023-
2027 Average 
2018-
2022 
2023-
2027 Average 
Personal Consumption Deflator 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0  
Unemployment Rate -0.5 1.0 -0.8 -0.2 -0.6 -0.4 
General Government Balance,  
% GDP -0.3 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.6 -0.5 
Deviation from Baseline,  
End of Period: 2020 2023 2027 2020 2023 2027 
General Government Debt,  
% GDP 0.4 1.6 3.7 1.3 2.7 4.4 
 
Results 
The results of both scenarios, according to the COSMO model, result in additional 
economic activity. In the case of public investment, more investment increases the 
capital stock of the economy, therefore pushing up potential output, which helps growth 
in the long run. In the labour market, employment is above baseline levels, particularly in 
the public sector, and unemployment consequently falls below its baseline level. The 
combination of more employment and more productive workers, due to the rise of 
capital intensity of the economy, helps to push up wages, which in turn increases 
consumption above its baseline level. Therefore, the impact on the economy is mainly 
through the non-traded sector because of the acceleration in internal demand, with a 
negligible effect on the traded sector. 
For the income tax shock, on the other hand, the most immediate effect of the decrease 
is the positive impact on disposable personal income. Consumption and savings both 
increase due to the changes in income levels. The increase in consumption pushes up 
internal demand, leading to an increase in employment and total wages. Increasing 
incomes and production naturally lead to an increase in GDP above its baseline level.  
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In the labour market, we observe more employment and a reduction in the 
unemployment rate as a result of the income tax reduction. The reaction of prices for 
both shocks is essentially flat. 
TABLE B  DEVIATIONS FROM BASELINE FOR THE JOINT PUBLIC INVESTMENT INCREASE AND 
INCOME TAX CUT SCENARIO 
 Public Investment Increase 
Percentage deviation from Baseline Level, Average: 2018-2022 2023-2027 Average 
 Gross Domestic Product at Basic Prices 1.1 2.5 1.8 
 Potential Output 0.8 2.6 1.7 
 Gross Value Added at Basic Prices, Trade Sector 0.1 0.7 0.4 
 Gross Value Added at Basic Prices, Non-Traded Sector 1.5 4.1 2.8 
 Total Investment 2.6 8.4 5.5 
 Personal Consumption of Goods and Services 1.6 3.1 2.3 
 Employed Persons 1.3 2.8 2.1 
 Disposable Income 1.9 3.3 2.6 
 Exports 0.1 0.8 0.5 
Deviations from Baseline, Average 2018-2022 2023-2027 Average 
 Personal Consumption Deflator 0.0 0.1 0.0 
 Unemployment Rate -0.7 -1.6 -1.2 
 General Government Balance, % GDP -0.8 -1.2 -1.0 
Deviation from Baseline, End of Period: 2020 2023 2027 
 General Government Debt, % GDP 1.7 4.1 7.8 
 
If we compare the variation with respect to the baseline of both shocks, we observe that 
increasing public investment has a more positive effect on economic growth than the 
reduction in income tax. The effect is also larger on potential output, as expected; 
increasing investment reinforces the capital stock but also labour, through increased 
economic activity. The positive impact on employment is larger again in the NDP 
scenario, consequently leading to a larger fall in the unemployment rate. On the other 
hand, we observe that in the tax cut scenario, despite a smaller increase in total 
employment, total consumption is actually higher with respect to the baseline than is the 
case in the other scenario. The larger effect is a consequence of the direct impact that 
the tax cut has on disposable income. 
The COSMO model also allows us to observe the projected results of introducing both 
the investment plan and the income tax reduction at the same time. The results of this 
exercise can be observed in Table B. As expected, the effects on the economy are 
approximately the combination of the two individual scenarios considered before, 
although there is some additional impact on the non-traded sector and total investment. 
The result overall is a strong stimulus in terms of the impact on economic activity, with 
robust increases on GDP, potential output and employment. On the other hand, the 
public finances are naturally affected, with government debt as a share of GDP almost 8 
percentage points above baseline levels, despite the strong increase in economic activity. 
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These results are subject to some caveats. First, COSMO does not explicitly model a 
‘productivity channel’, where public investment improves the overall behaviour of the 
economy by raising its productivity. The analysis focuses on the impact of public 
investment on the economy through its effect on internal demand, as opposed to 
potential long-term benefits due to improvements in infrastructure. Second, and related 
to the previous point, the final effects of the considered policies would be heavily 
dependent on the actual details of the policies. This caveat is particularly true for the 
investment plan. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, both scenarios result in a variety of impacts. Whereas the public 
investment scenario results in the larger positive impact on economic activity and 
employment, the tax cut produces a larger increase in consumption and a more balanced 
impact in sectoral terms. As previously mentioned, the details of the investment plan will 
be a key element in terms of its overall impact. A well targeted plan based on 
productivity-enhancing initiatives could result in an even more positive impact for the 
investment scenario. Such a plan also has the benefit of being versatile in meeting 
alternative policy objectives such as regional development which a policy focussed on 
reductions in taxation rates cannot. Finally, given the strength of recent economic 
activity, special care needs to be exercised in using fiscal policy to stimulate economic 
growth at this point. 
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MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS 
International monetary environment  
Following the volatility in global equity markets observed earlier in the year, 
financial conditions internationally have stabilised in recent months. The well 
signalled nature of increases in US policy rates, as well as the ongoing 
accommodative monetary policy in Europe and Japan, continue to provide a low 
and stable cost of finance internationally. More specifically in a European context, 
the ECB’s negative policy rate position is ensuring that yields on overnight 
22 |  Q uar t er ly  Eco nomi c  C omme nt ary  –  S um me r 2 01 8  
interest rates (Figure 14) continue to provide a stabilising factor for market 
stresses and provide significant low cost funding to financial institutions. 
 
FIGURE 14 DAILY EURO OVERNIGHT INDEX AVERAGE – EONIA RATE (%) 
 
 
Source:  European Central Bank, Statistical Data Warehouse. 
 
For Ireland, the low cost of financing on European markets, and in particular the 
ECB’s public sector asset purchase programme, have ensured that the cost of 
borrowing for the Exchequer has been reduced. Indeed the cost of financing for 
Irish bonds has declined, to stand at just under 1 per cent for a ten-year 
placement. Given the high debt levels which the Irish Exchequer is servicing, the 
low cost of financing has been essential in underpinning the economic recovery. 
In the medium term, as the ECB begins to unwind its extraordinary monetary 
policy measures, the cost of financing will rise. This could pose a considerable risk 
for Ireland and, where possible, locking in long-term funding at the current low 
rate levels would be a prudent course of policy action. 
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FIGURE 15 10-YEAR GOVERNMENT BOND YIELD (%) 
 
Source:  Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis database. 
 
Household credit and the mortgage market 
While the scars of the financial crisis still remain in the Irish mortgage market, 
recent data would point towards a normalisation of activity. Figure 16 presents 
the growth rates of credit to households from Irish resident credit 
institutions. The data are split by loans for house purchase and other personal 
loans (auto finance, credit cards, student loans etc.). For the first time since 2009, 
the stock of outstanding household credit has stopped falling. It must be noted 
however that household debt remains high and, with the end of deleveraging and 
household debt potentially beginning to rise again, this represents a material risk 
in terms of households’ vulnerability to economic shocks. Non-mortgage credit 
continued to expand in Q4 2017 at an annualised rate of 3.7 per cent. This 
continues the decline in the growth rate from the high point of 8.2 per cent in 
Q1 2017. 
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FIGURE 16 GROWTH RATES OF CREDIT TO HOUSEHOLDS (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, Credit, Money and Banking Statistics. 
Notes:  Data are taken from Central Bank of Ireland data release A.18, Growth rates series codes 777 and 1,252.  
 
As the decline in the level of credit to households appears to have ended, the 
share of mortgages in arrears also continues to fall. The improvement in the 
labour market as well as increasing house prices are both factors in determining a 
lower arrears rate. As of Q4 2017, the share of loans in arrears stood at 6.6 per 
cent, down marginally on the previous quarter and down from 7.4 per cent year-
on-year. This constitutes a total of 9.8 per cent of the balance of outstanding 
private dwelling home (PDH) mortgages. The default rate on buy-to-let (BTL) 
loans has also reduced but remains high. A challenge remains in dealing with the 
relatively high share of loans in very deep arrears. In general for the Irish financial 
sector, dealing with long term arrears cases, especially those where no borrower 
engagement has been forthcoming, remains a significant challenge.  
 
FIGURE 17 IRISH HOUSEHOLD MORTGAGE ACCOUNTS IN ARREARS BY TYPE OF LOAN (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, Mortgage Arrears Statistics. 
Notes:  PDH refers to private dwelling houses loans while BTL are buy-to-let loans. Arrears if greater than 90 days past due payments.  
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In terms of new mortgage lending, the sharp increase in house prices in the past 
number of months has begun to coincide with a significant increase in mortgage 
lending. In Q1 2018, the volume of new mortgage drawdowns increased by 13.5 
per cent year-on-year while the value of mortgages increased by 22.4 per cent. 
The relatively higher growth rate in the value relative to the volume of loans 
represents the fact that borrowers are drawing down larger and larger loans in an 
environment where house prices are increasing. The average loan size for 
mortgages was €224,818 in Q1 2018, which is 88 per cent of the peak value in 
Q1 2008.  
 
FIGURE 18 YEAR-ON-YEAR GROWTH RATE OF NEW MORTGAGE DRAWDOWNS (%) 
 
 
Source:  Banking and Payments Federation Ireland. 
 
With double-digit increases in mortgage lending and house prices, and with a 
rapidly expanding domestic economy, it is imperative to establish whether such 
developments are an early sign of overheating in the market or represent 
sustainable market dynamics. 
 
In assessing this issue, three salient points arise. First, the value and volume of 
new mortgages may be rapidly growing but remain low in historical terms. The 
number of new loans is well below the annualised figure for 2003, the earliest 
available data and a year which pre-dates some of the most excessive credit 
boom years that followed. 
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FIGURE 19 TOTAL NEW DRAWDOWNS OVERVIEW (VALUE AND VOLUME), 2003-2018 
    A. Value and Volume of New Drawdowns                      B. Share of Market by Borrower Type 
  
 
Source:  Banking and Payments Federation Ireland. 
Note:  FTBs (First Time Buyers), SSBs (Second and Subsequent Buyers), and BTL (Buy-to-Lets). 
 
Second, the majority of loans are now accounted for by First Time Buyers and 
Second Time Buyers with few top-ups or buy-to-let loans. Research for Ireland 
and other countries indicates that investment loans are a higher credit risk (Lydon 
and McCarthy, 2013;11 Haugwhout et al., 2011;12 Lee, 201313). The lower share of 
buy-to-let loans and top-ups suggests a more stable basis for current new 
lending. However, it should be noted that recently, a number of buy-to-let 
lenders are advertising credit on interest-only terms for the first time since the 
crisis. Interest-only loans have been shown to carry a heightened credit risk (Kelly 
et al., 2014).14 A substantial rise in interest-only credit for investment purposes, if 
it materialises, could heighten the riskiness of new lending. Furthermore, as an 
indication of heightened buy-to-let lending, two new financial institutions have 
submitted data to the Central Bank under the macroprudential framework 
indicating for the first time that they are lending more than €50 million per 
annum (see Kinghan et al., 2018). 
 
 
                                                          
 
11  Lyndon, R. and Y. McCarthy (2013). ‘What Lies Beneath? Understanding Recent Trends in Irish Mortgage Arrears’, The 
Economic and Social Review, 44, issue 1, https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eso:journl:v:44:y:2013:i:1:p:117-150. 
12  Haughwout, Andrew, Donghoon Lee, Joseph Tracy and Wilbert van der Klaauw (2011). ‘Real estate investors, the 
leverage cycle, and the housing market crisis’, No 514, Staff Reports, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fednsr:514. 
13  Lee, Donghoon, Christopher Mayer and Joseph Tracy (2012). ‘A New Look at Second Liens’, No 18269, NBER Working 
Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18269. 
14  Kelly, Jane, Gerard Kennedy and Tara McIndoe-Calder (2014). ‘Interest-only mortgages in Ireland’, No 05/EL/14, 
Economic Letters, Central Bank of Ireland. 
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FIGURE 20 THE FIRST TIME BUYER CREDIT CREEP  
  Loan-to-Income Ratio Distribution (%)          Loan-to-Value Distribution (%) 
  
 
Source:  Banking and Payments Federation Ireland. 
 
Thirdly, as house prices increase at a faster pace than incomes and wealth 
accumulation, borrowers are likely to have to draw down larger and larger loan 
sizes. Using data from Kinghan et al. (2018) on the distribution of mortgage credit 
conditions in Ireland, it can be seen that FTB LTV and LTI ratios have been 
increasing with more loans originating at the maximum allowable under the 
current macroprudential framework. Indeed, the increase of FTB credit 
conditions towards the upper limit of the macroprudential framework highlights 
the importance of the regulations and their ability to ensure that house prices do 
not decouple from incomes and other housing market fundamental variables. 
Indeed, Keenan and O’Brien (2018) explore the determinants of new mortgage 
lending as a ratio of disposable income as an early warning indicator of stress in 
the mortgage market. Their estimates suggest that new lending in Ireland is 
currently in line with fundamentals but that any substantial increase in the 
coming years could become unsustainable.  
 
At present, the low level of transactions in the mortgage market, the 
concentration of lending towards non-investment borrowers, and the relatively 
strict credit conditions under which loans are being originated suggest the risks 
from new lending activity are contained. However, legacy issues remain and, with 
leverage levels rising, the impact of an interest rate reversal or other external 
shock could have a negative impact on credit performance. Furthermore, any 
protracted continuation of rapid lending growth could lead to a build-up of new 
systemic vulnerabilities. Within this context, anticipatory policy action, such as 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
0-3 3-3.5 > 3.5
2016 2017
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
0-70 70-80 80-89 90+
FTB LTV 2016 FTB LTV 2017
28 |  Q uar t er ly  Eco nomi c  C omme nt ary  –  S um me r 2 01 8  
the recent suggestions around raising the counter-cyclical capital buffer in a pre-
emptive fashion,15 would be prudent and appropriate. 
 
Trends in the SME and corporate credit market 
Turning to the provision of credit to non-financial corporations, the overall stock 
of credit is continuing to decline, down by -7.4 per cent in Q4 2017 year-on-year. 
Credit to firms outside the financial and property related sectors, which can be 
termed as finance for the real economy, grew through most of 2017 but fell back 
slightly in the final quarter.  
  
FIGURE 21 GROWTH RATES OF CREDIT TO PRIVATE SECTOR ENTERPRISES (%)  
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, Credit, Money and Banking Statistics. 
Notes:  Data are taken from Central Bank of Ireland data release A.14, Growth rates series codes 17, 17.1 and 17.2.  
 
Another aspect of new lending that provides a guide to the health of the 
domestic economy is lending to small business. Since 2013, total annual gross 
new lending to SMEs has grown steadily. For 2017, total new lending amounted 
to just over €5 billion, up from €4.5 billion in 2016 representing a 10 per cent 
increase year-on-year. The increase in the level of new lending for SMEs is 
consistent with the deepening of the domestic recovery and the normalisation of 
activity in the banking sector. 
 
 
                                                          
 
15  Donnery, S. (2018). ‘When is the time right? Macroprudential Policy and the Cycle’, speech to Maynooth University, 
May, 2018: www.centralbank.ie/news/article/when-is-the-right-time-macroprudential-policy-and-the-cycle-deputy-
governor-donnery-31-May-2018. 
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While the sectoral distribution of credit growth has been broad-based, new 
lending flows to the wholesale and retail sector have been growing in a 
particularly rapid manner (approximately 35 per cent year-on-year). The 
wholesale and retail sector is particularly reliant on the domestic economy and it 
is unsurprising that credit to this sector is recovering as the domestic economy 
grows rapidly. 
 
FIGURE 22 ANNUAL NEW LENDING TO IRISH SMES BY SECTOR (€ MILLION)  
 
 
Source:  Banking and Payments Federation Ireland. 
 
 
While the level of new lending has grown year-on-year, survey data on rejection 
rates for bank finance across SMEs point to diverging trends in the ease of credit 
access. Figure 23 presents the average rejection rate for SMEs seeking finance 
separately for micro-, small- and medium-sized firms. While in general credit 
availability has improved over time, since mid-2016 micro-sized firms have 
experienced a tightening of credit conditions with rejection rates rising, which 
may point to uncertainties in bank lending following the outcome of the Brexit 
referendum in the UK. In summary, it appears that credit flows are returning to 
the SME sector but financing availability has tightened moderately for the 
smallest firms.  
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FIGURE 23 AVERAGE REJECTION RATE FOR SMES SEEKING FINANCE (%)  
 
 
Source:  Banking and Payments Federation Ireland. 
 
 
Interest rates and the cost of finance 
The cost of finance in Ireland for both corporate and household credit is high by 
European standards. More recently, some reductions in lending rates are 
occurring. The standard variable rate on new mortgage loans in Ireland stood at 
3.31 per cent as of Q1 2018; this is down slightly year-on-year from 3.38 in 
Q1 2017. However, comparing Irish new house purchase loans relative to other 
Eurozone economies, it can be seen that interest rates on mortgages in Ireland 
remain the highest of comparator countries (Figure 24).  
  
FIGURE 24 INTEREST ON NEW HOUSE PURCHASE LOANS TO HOUSEHOLDS – EUROPEAN 
COMPARISON (%)  
 
 
Source:  ECB MFI data. 
Notes:  Countries included are: AT, BE, EE, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, LT, NL, PT, SI. These countries are selected due to data availability. Data 
differ between this chart presented and the text as the ECB comparison data include restructured mortgages whereas the new 
business SVR is only for new drawdowns.  
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A similar picture emerges in relation to corporate interest rates. Figure 25 
presents the interest rates on new business loans for non-financial corporates in 
Ireland relative to the average for the Eurozone. Two series are presented: 1) 
covering all loans and 2) capturing loans of less than €250,000 which is used as a 
proxy for loans for SMEs. In March 2018, the average rate on new loans for all 
Irish corporates was 2.32 per cent and the Eurozone average was 1.56 per cent. 
For small Irish corporate loans, the interest rate in June 2017 was 4.59 per cent 
compared to the Eurozone average of 2.09 per cent. Interest rates are down year-
on-year for small corporates but remain considerably higher than for their 
European peers. 
 
FIGURE 25 INTEREST RATES ON NEW CORPORATE LOANS – EUROPEAN COMPARISON  
 
 
Source:  ECB MFI data. Small loans refer to loans less than €250,000. 
 
 
PRICES AND EARNINGS 
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) indicates inflation has remained low in the year to 
Q1 2018, averaging 100.4 index points, relative to 100.1 index points for the same 
period last year. Figure 26 highlights a persistently low inflation rate across three 
different measures. In fact, the most recent data for April 2018 indicate a falling 
price level with prices inclusive of all items over the last 12 months averaging a 
decline of 0.4 per cent. When excluding energy and unprocessed food, this 
measure falls even further at 0.6 per cent. 
 
While overall inflationary pressures are low, there is some variation across 
different groups of products and services. In Q1 2018, increasing prices were 
evident in the following areas: housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels 
(+4.1 per cent), restaurants and hotels (+2.2 per cent) and education (+1.6 per 
cent). Other goods in the economy continue to experience declines in price. In 
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Q1 2018, prices fell annually by 3.0 per cent in clothing and footwear. 
Furnishings, household equipment and routine household maintenance has 
experienced the strongest scale of deflation, down 3.8 per cent relative to the 
previous year. As of April, the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) fell 
annually by 0.1 per cent. For Q1 2018, the HICP rose annually by 0.5 per cent 
resulting in the Irish economy experiencing one of the lowest rates of inflation 
across the EU28.  
 
FIGURE 26 ANNUAL GROWTH IN INFLATION (%)  
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
The difference in price trends between the goods and services sectors is quite 
apparent. The underlying trends in the CPI (Figure 27) for Q1 2018 indicates 
service prices have averaged a 1.1 per cent annual increase while the price of 
goods has fallen by 0.8 per cent. Examining the CPI of goods reveals that, as of 
April 2018, prices have fallen to levels last seen in late 1999.  
 
Given our current forecasts of further reductions in unemployment rates, 
accelerated wage growth, and thus increased private consumption expenditure, it 
is expected that the disinflation experienced by certain goods will dissipate 
through 2018. In 2019, the exact nature of Brexit could have a significant impact 
on inflation; Lawless and Morgenroth (2018) suggest the imposition of potential 
tariffs between the UK and the EU and other trade restrictions could cause the 
domestic CPI to rise between 2 and 3.1 per cent.16 
 
                                                          
 
16  Lawless, M. and E. Morgenroth (2018). ‘Brexit and Irish Consumers’, Quarterly Economic Commentary, Spring 2018. 
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FIGURE 27 DECOMPOSITION OF ANNUAL (%) CPI GROWTH INTO GOODS AND SERVICES GROWTH  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
In Q1 2018, seasonally-adjusted Average Hourly Earnings increased by 0.8 per 
cent compared to the previous quarter. On an annual basis, earnings increased by 
2.5 per cent, to €22.83 per hour. The largest increase for the quarter was 
observed in the ICT sector, rising annually by 6.4 per cent (an additional €1.87 per 
hour). Other notable increases occurred in financial, insurance and real estate 
activities (+4.1 per cent) and education (+5.2 per cent). Figure 28 highlights an 
acceleration in the growth of earnings occurring in more recent quarters. As of 
Q1 2018, average weekly earnings reached €738.14, representing a 2.6 per cent 
increase from €719.2 in Q1 2017.  
 
FIGURE 28  TRENDS IN AVERAGE EARNINGS PER WEEK AND PER MONTH (€) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
Note:  The y-axis on the LHS scale has a very low range of values.  
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Figure 29 presents the four-quarter rolling average growth rate in earnings by 
sector. As of Q1 2018, a positive trend persists with overall earnings increasing by 
2.4 per cent compared to the same period last year. The largest annual gains 
occurred within public administration and ICT sectors, rising by €41.77 and 
€50.43 respectively. A worldwide shortage of STEM workers suggests recent 
increases in the growth of ICT wages and employment are also likely to persist 
throughout 2018.17 While the majority of sectors experienced improvements, 
those employed in construction saw a minor decrease in average weekly earnings 
of 0.4 per cent. 
 
FIGURE 29 FOUR-QUARTER ROLLING AVERAGE GROWTH BY SECTOR IN WEEKLY EARNINGS 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
In light of the Commentary’s forecast of strong domestic demand and the 
continued positive developments in the labour market performance, both wages 
and prices are expected to increase over the next two years. Consumer prices are 
expected to increase moderately by 0.7 per cent in 2018, followed by 1.1 per cent 
in 2019. Earnings are forecast to rise by 2.9 per cent and 3.6 per cent for the 
same periods, meaning real wage growth is likely to continue rising as the 
economy approaches full employment levels. 
 
 
                                                          
 
17  Collins McNicholas Recruitment and HR Services Group (2016). ‘Information & Communication Technology’, Labour 
Market Review. 
-3.0
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
2014Q1 2015Q1 2016Q1 2017Q1 2018Q1
Manufacturing Construction
Wholesale and retail trade Information and communication
Finance and insurance Public administration and defence
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  S umm er  20 18  |  3 5  
TABLE 2  INFLATION MEASURES 
 2016 2017 2018 2019 
 Annual % Change  
CPI 0.0 0.3 0.7 1.1 
Growth in Average Hourly Earnings 1.7 2.0 2.9 3.6 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI forecasts. 
 
DEMAND 
Household sector consumption  
Given the ongoing difficulties associated with estimates of Irish output levels, 
household consumption expenditure18 is, therefore, a better indicator for 
describing the material wellbeing of the Irish population. Figure 30 highlights the 
discrepancy between the year-on-year growth rates of GDP per capita and 
household consumption expenditure per capita. Growth in GDP per capita 
exhibits not only higher volatility but also a slightly different trend, particularly 
since 2015. Despite growing positively in 2017, household consumption 
expenditure growth rate has slowed down relative to 2015 and 2016. GDP growth 
however, accelerated in 2017 relative to 2016. 
 
FIGURE 30  GDP PER CAPITA AND PERSONAL CONSUMPTION ON GOODS AND SERVICES PER 
CAPITA, YEAR-ON-YEAR CHANGE (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
Note:  Quarterly National Accounts at Constant Market Prices and Seasonally Adjusted.  
 
In 2017, household consumption expenditure continued to benefit from the 
ongoing improvements in the labour market. The last quarterly National Accounts 
 
                                                          
 
18  Expenditure on goods and services that are purchased by individuals. 
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show that, on an annualised basis, personal consumption expenditure increased 
by 2.8 per cent in Quarter 3, 2017 and 1.9 per cent in Quarter 4, 2017. On a 
quarter-on-quarter basis, consumption spending increased by 1.9 per cent and 
0.3 per cent, respectively. The persistent fall in unemployment, increase in 
disposable incomes and an improvement in household balance sheets have all 
provided a supportive context for household spending. Although no data are 
available for 2018, the rising consumption pattern is likely to have continued, 
albeit at a slower pace. 
 
FIGURE 31 QUARTERLY PERSONAL CONSUMPTION ON GOODS AND SERVICES – CONSTANT 
MARKET PRICES AND SEASONALLY ADJUSTED 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Retail sales can be used as a leading indicator for consumption. This provides a 
snapshot of what goods and services households are purchasing. Table 3 presents 
retail sales for selected items in terms of the annual growth rate in the volume of 
sales. For all businesses, retail sales are up 1.1 per cent in the year to the first 
quarter of 2018. If motor sales are excluded, sales are up by 4.5 per cent.  
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TABLE 3 GROWTH IN SELECT RETAIL SALES (VOLUME) ITEMS (Q1 2018) 
Retail Business – NACE REV 2 Volume of Sales 
 Annual % change 
Motor trades -3.3 
Non-specialised stores (excluding department stores) 5.6 
Department stores 4.8 
Clothing, footwear and textiles 2.7 
Furniture and lighting 9.2 
All businesses excl. motor trades 4.5 
All businesses 1.1 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Sales were boosted by home improvements (furniture and lighting are up by 9.2 
per cent year-on-year) which seems to be closely related to the recovery in the 
housing market. The overall trends in retails sales are displayed in Figure 32. This 
chart presents a three-month rolling average of retail sales for total sales, sales 
excluding the motor trade, and for household equipment. Sales of housing 
equipment19 experience high growth rate (10.6 per cent in May), compared with 
other retail sales. Despite remaining strongly positive, retail sales (both including 
and excluding motor sales) seem to have slowed down since the beginning of the 
year. 
 
FIGURE 32 GROWTH IN RETAIL SALES INDEX VOLUME ADJUSTED (BASE 2005=100), THREE-
MONTH ROLLING AVERAGE (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
 
                                                          
 
19  This includes furniture and lighting; hardware, paints and glass and electrical goods. 
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Figure 33 presents the ESRI/KBC Consumer Sentiment Index which tracks the 
monthly views of households on their current and future economic perspectives. 
The three-month rolling average index reached its highest value in May 2018 
(107.9 index points). Despite falling slightly in April 2018 (-2.0 per cent from 
March), the index rose in May by 0.5 per cent. Since 2013 the ESRI/KBC Consumer 
Sentiment Index has followed an overall positive trend. One of the main 
determinants of this is the strengthening of households’ views on their personal 
financial outlooks relative to 12 months ago. 
 
FIGURE 33 ESRI/KBC CONSUMER SENTIMENT INDICATORS 
 
 
Source:  ESRI/KBC. 
 
In addition to understanding trends in consumer sentiment, further insight into 
Irish households’ appetite for spending and views on economic activity can be 
drawn from their savings behaviour. Figure 34 displays the three-month rolling 
average of ESRI/Bank of Ireland Savings Index, which measures Irish peoples’ 
sentiment towards savings. The overall Index had been rising since August 2017, 
while it dropped slightly in March and remained stable in April 2018. Relative to 
April 2017, the overall Savings Index is up by 9.2 per cent. 
 
The two sub-indexes that compose the Savings Index are the Savings Attitudes 
and the Savings Environment. The three-month average of the Savings Attitudes 
Index20 increased by 8.6 per cent to 103 points in April 2018, from 95 points in 
April 2017. This increase was mainly driven by a heightened satisfaction with the 
 
                                                          
 
20  The Savings Attitude Index is built on two questions which ask respondents about their saving behaviour and how 
they feel about the amount they save. 
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amount saved (+13.6 per cent). The Savings Environment Index21 increased by 9.7 
per cent in April 2018 as views on both the present (+8.5 per cent) and future 
(+10.9 per cent) savings landscape improved. To explore the impact of Brexit on 
households’ savings, in April 2018 the Bank of Ireland and the ESRI undertook a 
bespoke survey module of the regular Savings Index. We found that few Irish 
households were saving to prepare for Brexit. The rise in savings rates observed 
over the past 12 months does not appear to have been driven by the impact of 
the UK’s exit from the European Union. 
 
FIGURE 34  SAVINGS INDEX AND SUB-INDEXES, THREE-MONTH ROLLING AVERAGE 
 
 
Source:  ESRI/Bank of Ireland. 
 
The overall position of Irish households’ net worth, which is the stock of financial 
and housing assets minus the stock of liabilities, is presented in Figure 35. Irish 
household net worth grew by 2.1 per cent in Quarter 4, 2017 relative to Quarter 
3, as loan repayments reduce the stock of outstanding liabilities (-0.8 per cent) 
and rising asset prices (+1.7 per cent) raise the total value of domestic balance 
sheets. Net worth is now at the highest level (€726.8 billion) since the Q2 2007 
peak of €719.6 billion. A large proportion of the increase in Q4 2017 was driven 
by a rise in the housing stock of €8.5 billion. Financial assets rose by €5.1 billion 
and liabilities declined by €1.2 billion in the Q4 of 2017 relative to Q3 2017.  
 
Household net worth decreased considerably during the financial crisis as housing 
assets fell sharply in value. In the second quarter of 2012, net worth was at 
 
                                                          
 
21  The Savings Environment Index is built on two questions which ask whether or not respondents believe that the 
current period is a good time to save and whether or not they believe that in six months’ time it will be a good time 
to save.  
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€430 billion and housing assets were worth €295 billion. In the fourth quarter of 
2017, total net worth was up by 69.0 per cent and housing assets by 69.8 per 
cent. While improving, financial assets are up only by 17.2 per cent relative to 
Q2 2012 and liabilities are down by 19.0 per cent. Therefore, the improvement in 
overall net worth is driven to a large extent by the recovery in the housing 
market. 
 
Although, overall net worth in Q4 2017 is above the Q2 2007 peak level by 1.0 per 
cent, housing assets are 16.9 per cent lower in value now compared with 2007. 
Financial assets are 23.9 per cent higher than at the peak level and liabilities are 
19.5 per cent lower in value terms.  
 
FIGURE 35  IRISH HOUSEHOLD NET WORTH (€ BILLION) 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, Quarterly Financial Accounts. 
 
Property market developments 
National property prices started to accelerate during the second half of 2016 and 
reached double digit growth rates in May 2017. Growth in property prices 
continued to pick up into 2018. Figure 36 plots the year-on-year growth rates in 
residential property prices by property type. In March 2018 prices increased by 
12.7 per cent year-on-year, the fastest growth rate since May 2015. This 
compares with an increase of 9.8 per cent in the year to March 2017 and an 
increase of 7.4 per cent in the year to March 2016. National property prices still 
remain 21.6 per cent lower than the peak reached in May 2007.  
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In the year to March 2018, the price of apartments grew by 14.3 per cent year-
on-year and the price of houses increased by 12.5 per cent. The faster pace of 
apartment prices was mainly driven by developments in the Dublin market. 
 
FIGURE 36 ANNUAL HOUSE PRICE GROWTH (%) BY DWELLING 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
Property price developments for Dublin and the rest of Ireland are presented in 
Figure 37. Early 2015 price growth in Dublin was much faster than outside the 
capital. However, in 2016 prices in the rest of the country began to grow sharply, 
posting double digit growth almost every month. By the end of 2017, growth 
rates in Dublin and in the rest of Ireland began to converge. 
 
FIGURE 37 ANNUAL HOUSE PRICE GROWTH (%) BY REGION 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
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In March 2018, Dublin property prices grew by 12.1 per cent and prices in the rest 
of the country increased by 13.4 per cent. The price of apartments in Dublin grew 
by 13.9 per cent and by 13.4 per cent outside the capital. 
 
The current high prices reflect a substantial shortage of houses in the Irish 
market. Although prices are still below those in the 2007 peak, the sustained 
growth poses significant affordability issues, particularly for low income earners 
in the Dublin market. 
 
Rising house prices are more likely to affect those at the bottom of the income 
distribution, for whom it is harder to obtain a mortgage and for whom housing 
costs have a much larger weight in the household budget. Figure 38 shows the 
growth rate in the prices of residential properties purchased (registered at the 
Property Services Regulatory Authority) per quintile. While this analysis does not 
control for the quality of the properties, it does show how prices across the house 
price distribution evolve across time. Although we cannot establish a direct 
relationship between the people at the bottom of the income distribution and 
the income of people who purchased the houses, we can infer that the houses 
bought at the bottom (top) of the house price distribution were more likely to be 
bought by people who are at the lower (higher) end of the income distribution. 
The sharper growth rates in prices at the lower end of the distribution does 
suggest that affordability pressures are increasing on a relative basis for those at 
the lower end of the income distribution. 
 
Overall, it seems that house prices in the 1st quintile are more elastic, i.e. they are 
more sensitive to changes in the housing market and overall economy than prices 
in the 5th quintile. During the downturn in the housing market, house prices in the 
bottom quintile fell the most: -26.7 per cent in 2011 and -17.1 per cent in 2012  
(-4.2 and -7.9 in the top quintile, respectively). As the housing market recovers, 
house prices in the bottom quintile increase more than those at the top end of 
the distribution. In 2016, house prices in Quintile 1 increased by 11.2 per cent and 
prices in Quintile 5 increased by 8.0 per cent. In 2017, they increased by 20.8 per 
cent and 8.4 per cent, respectively. 
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FIGURE 38 ANNUAL GROWTH (%) IN AVERAGE PURCHASED PROPERTY PRICES, PER QUINTILE 
 
 
Source:  Property Price Register. 
Notes:  Properties without full market price information were dropped. This analysis does not control for the characteristics and 
qualities of the properties sold, only takes into account the distribution of prices.  
 
Rents are also continuing to increase in the Irish market. The national 
standardised average rent at the end of Q4 2017 (€1,054) is already above that of 
the previous peak in Q3 2007 (€988). 
 
National rents in Quarter 4, 2017 increased by 6.4 per cent on an annual basis, 
continuing the rise that has been observed since early 2013, as can be seen from 
Figure 39. Nevertheless, this represents a slowdown when compared to Q3 2017 
(8.0 per cent) and Q4 2016 (7.3 per cent). 
 
After a steep increase of rents in Dublin in Quarter 3, 2017 (8.0 per cent year-on-
year) the growth rate in Quarter 4, 2017 slowed down to 5.2 per cent year-on-
year. Rents in the Greater Dublin Area (excluding Dublin) accelerated to 7.5 per 
cent year-on-year and rents outside the Greater Dublin Area grew by 7.1 per cent 
in Quarter 4, 2017. Since mid-2016 rents in Dublin are above the pre-crisis peak 
experienced in Quarter 4, 2007. As housing supply continues to be below 
estimates of structural demand, upward pressures in the rental market are 
expected to continue. 
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FIGURE 39 RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES BOARD NATIONAL RENTAL INDEX (BASE Q3 2007 = 100), 
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGE 
 
 
Source:  Residential Tenancies Board (RTB). 
Note:  GDA stands for Greater Dublin Area.  
 
SUPPLY 
Investment 
A hallmark of Ireland’s recent strong economic growth has been a considerable 
pick-up in investment. While the distortionary effects of large multinational 
operations pose difficulties in interpreting the aggregate flows, underlying 
modified investment (which removes assets transactions relating to aircraft 
leasing and research and development related intellectual property imports) 
arguably provide a more accurate assessment of investment patterns in the real 
economy. Figure 40 presents annual aggregate Gross Fixed Capital Formation and 
the CSO modified series.22 Both series have risen rapidly in recent years with both 
the modified and non-modified investment levels at or above their pre-crisis peak 
by 2017.  
 
 
                                                          
 
22  As the 2017 National Accounts have yet to be published, to get aggregate figures we have summed the quarterly 
data.  
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FIGURE 40  ANNUALISED INVESTMENT AND MODIFIED INVESTMENT – CONSTANT MARKET 
PRICES (€ MILLION) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office, Quarterly National Accounts Data.  
 
To evaluate the trend over time in investment, Figure 41 presents the growth 
rate of the modified series. Recent growth has been particularly strong. On an 
annual basis, growth in investment was 10 per cent in 2017 on the back of robust 
growth of 8 per cent in 2016. Given the open and globalised nature of the Irish 
economy, much of the stimulus for increased capital formation has come from 
the cyclical recovery in the international economy. However, the improving 
domestic economic position is also now beginning to feed through into additional 
capital formation, in particular through building and construction activity. 
 
FIGURE 41 GROWTH RATE IN MODIFIED INVESTMENT – CONSTANT MARKET PRICES (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office, Quarterly National Accounts Data, Release Annex Table 4E.  
 
 -
 10,000
 20,000
 30,000
 40,000
 50,000
 60,000
 70,000
 80,000
 90,000
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
Total GFCF Modified GFCF
-30%
-25%
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
46 |  Q uar t er ly  Eco nomi c  C omme nt ary  –  S um me r 2 01 8  
Given the continued increase in investment the question arises as to whether 
such investment is sustainable or poses an economic risk due to potential 
overheating. A notable feature of Irish capital formation in recent years has been 
the changing composition of the assets which are being accumulated. In the 
Celtic Tiger and credit boom phases of Irish economy development, investment in 
building and construction accounted for over 50 per cent of capital formation. 
However, in recent years, there is a pronounced shift towards investment in 
intangibles as well as a rise in investment in machinery and equipment. 
Accounting for up to 15 per cent of investment during the period 1995-2008, the 
share of investment made up of intangible assets now stands at over 30 per cent. 
While the recent surge in intangibles reflects some company specific strategies, 
an increase can still be seen in the modified CSO series which is more reflective of 
the actual productive use of capital in Ireland. 
 
While part of the change may be attributed to the rebalancing of capital 
formation following the construction bust, the deeper structural change in 
industrial activity towards investment in non-physical assets and service 
industries using intangible capital is undoubtedly, also a relevant consideration. 
This structural change has important implications for economic activity as well as 
our understanding of how investment spending is determined and financed in the 
economy. For example, intangible assets typically carry a different financing 
requirement which may alter the relationship between credit and output in these 
sectors. 
 
FIGURE 42 TREND IN SHARE OF INVESTMENT BY ASSET TYPE – CONSTANT MARKET PRICES (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office, Quarterly National Accounts Data.  
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As intangibles have become a larger component of Irish investment, and 
machinery and equipment investments are driven increasingly by large 
multinationals, understanding trend growth rates in these series becomes 
important for forecasting and analytical purposes. Figure 43 presents the growth 
rate in the trend level of investment for machinery and intangibles over the 
period 1996-2017 using a simple Hodrick-Prescott filter.23 Two versions are 
presented: one for the full period and a second which stops the trend calculation 
at 2014 to avoid the recent fluctuations. For recent years, trend growth rates are 
between 5-10 per cent suggesting that, regardless of the potential for major 
volatility coming from global corporation activities, we should expect strong 
growth in both these investment items in the coming years. However, in a Special 
Article to this Commentary, FitzGerald (2018) notes the highly globalised nature 
of intangible investment and the ability of global firms to separate the returns 
from IP from domestic capital and labour inputs into production. This complicates 
the relationship between sectoral output and investment in the Irish economy. 
 
FIGURE 43 TREND GROWTH IN INTANGIBLES AND MACHINERY – CONSTANT MARKET PRICES (%) 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ analysis using CSO data. Lambda set at 6 for annual data.  
Note: Mod M&E is modified machinery and equipment. 
 
Despite the growth in investment at an aggregate level, recent research indicates 
lower rates of fixed asset formation amongst domestic firms. Lawless et al. 
(2018)24 investigate whether Irish SMEs are investing in line with their economic 
fundamentals and find an investment gap of approximately 30 per cent in 2016. 
 
                                                          
 
23  The Hodrick-Prescott filter is a statistical transformation that removes the cyclical component of a time series from 
raw data. 
24  Lawless, M., C. O’Toole and R. Slaymaker (2018). ‘Estimating an SME investment gap and the contribution of 
financing frictions’, ESRI Working Paper, WP589. 
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Mod M&E (Trend to 2014) Mod Intangibles (Trend to 2014)
Mod M&E (Trend to 2017) Mod Intangibles (Trend to 2017)
48 |  Q uar t er ly  Eco nomi c  C omme nt ary  –  S um me r 2 01 8  
Further research by Papa et al. (2018)25 show that productivity levels in Irish firms 
are considerably lower than their foreign counterparts. Coupling low investment 
with a productivity gap, it is clear that domestic companies in Ireland have scope 
to expand investment to boost productive capacity.  
 
Business sentiment 
To capture the current expectations of enterprises in relation to their investment 
plans, the Markit Purchasing Managers’ Index provides real time insight into 
activity in the manufacturing, services and construction sectors. It is shown in 
Figure 44. A reading above 50 indicates an expansion. Throughout 2017, and into 
2018, the purchasing managers’ expectations have been improving, reflecting the 
buoyancy of the domestic economy and the improvement in business conditions. 
Some moderation in March 2018 may reflect concerns around global trading 
conditions given the heightened possibility of protectionist policies being 
adopted, particularly by the US. 
 
FIGURE 44 BUSINESS AND CONSTRUCTION PMI FOR IRELAND 
 
 
Source:  Markit Purchasing Managers’ Index. 
 
Figure 45 presents the forward looking indicators of purchasing activity in the 
Markit index. We present data for both manufacturing and services to provide a 
broad based review of trends in purchasing activity. As before, levels of the Index 
above 50 indicate an expansion in activity. It is clear that all sectors are in 
 
                                                          
 
25  Papa, J., L. Rehill and B. O’Connor (2018). ‘Patterns of Firm Level Productivity in Ireland’, Department of Finance 
Technical Working Paper.  
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expansionary territory throughout the period. For services, 2017 saw a softening 
of forward looking purchase planning, and this has continued into 2018. In terms 
of the rate of growth, the moderation towards the end of 2017 in the 
manufacturing sector has recovered in early 2018. More generally, the forward 
looking indicators point towards a positive and stable outlook in terms of 
business activity. 
 
FIGURE 45 FORWARD LOOKING INDICATORS FOR PURCHASING ACTIVITY 
 
 
Source:  Markit Purchasing Managers’ Index. 
 
Building investment and housing completions 
Construction investment in Ireland has recovered strongly in the past two years. 
This has been mainly driven by investment in other building and construction 
activities which has overtaken dwellings as the largest investment component. 
Other building and construction relates to commercial property and 
infrastructure (including roads, rail etc). The level of investment in this asset class 
has surpassed its peak pre-crisis level. As public infrastructure investments have 
not followed a rapid trajectory, much of the growth in this area can be attributed 
to the buoyant commercial property sector. Such rapid investment in this area 
poses a potential risk of overheating and a subsequent reversal in prices if the 
level of activity and transactions cool.26 Indeed, recent price trends in this area 
point towards a very rapid deceleration from 2015 levels. This may suggest a 
softening of demand-side pressures.  
 
 
                                                          
 
26  The Central Bank published data on CRE value changes as part of the CCyB public dataset.  
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On the residential front, dwelling investment has grown rapidly in the past two 
years in line with the recovery in residential construction. It is expected such 
growth will continue given the acknowledged undersupply of housing. 
 
FIGURE 46 INVESTMENT: BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION BY ASSET TYPE – CONSTANT PRICES 
(€ MILLION) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office, Quarterly National Accounts Data. 
 
Underpinned by strong housing demand, we expect housing completions to grow 
strongly this year. We expect housing completions (as measured by electricity 
connections) to reach 25,000 units in 2018, growing again to 31,000 in 2019. 
Despite the difficulties in forecasting the intangible and machinery items in 
investment, we maintain an optimistic position for overall investment in 2018 and 
2019 given the relative buoyancy in the domestic economy. In particular, we 
expect annual average growth in investment of 13 per cent in 2018 and 13.4 per 
cent in 2019. 
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FIGURE 47 ANNUAL HOUSING COMPLETIONS (2018-2019 FORECASTS) – TO 2017 ACTUAL 
 
 
Source:  Department of Environment and QEC Forecasts. 
 
LABOUR MARKET 
The Irish labour market continues to perform strongly in 2018; the 
unemployment rate is reaching pre-crisis levels and wages are beginning to 
increase. Overall, inflation remains low and the growth in wages has been 
moderate. In the medium term, there is room for increasing the labour force27 
and employment among the less educated, which would help potential output in 
the economy to grow. 
 
Unemployment 
While the Live Register is not a precise measure of unemployment,28 as it 
includes part-time and some seasonal and casual workers, it is one of the most 
up-to-date and detailed labour market measures. 
 
The figures for the first four months of 2018 show that the downward trajectory 
of people on the Live Register continued. On a seasonally-adjusted basis, the Live 
Register recorded a monthly decrease of 3,100 (-1.3 per cent) in April 2018, 
resulting in a seasonally-adjusted total of 229,600 people out of work. This 
represents an annual decrease of 37,800 (-14.0 per cent). As can be seen from 
Figure 38, the number of persons on the Live Register in April 2018 (229,600) is 
still above the 2007 lowest level (156,300) but well below the 2011 peak 
(448,700).  
 
                                                          
 
27  Particularly of women and the disabled. See Quarterly Economic Commentary, Spring 2018. 
28  The Live Register provides a monthly series of the numbers of people registered for Jobseekers Benefit, Jobseekers 
Allowance or other statutory entitlements at the Irish Department of Social Protection. 
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About 25,000 people under 25 years old were registered in April 2018, this 
represents a fall of 2.0 per cent relative to March 2018 and of 18.6 per cent 
relative to April 2017. It is the lowest number recorded on the Live Register 
among the young since February 2001.29 The number of people above 25 years in 
the Live Register in April 2018 was around 212,000, down by 1.3 from the 
previous month and 13.3 from April 2017.  
 
FIGURE 48 NUMBERS ON THE LIVE REGISTER (‘000) BY AGE: JANUARY 2006 TO JANUARY 2018 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Since 201230 the Live Register publishes detailed data on the duration of the 
registries, which can be used has a proxy for short- and long-term unemployment 
(Table 5). While short-term unemployment had the largest decline in the Live 
Register during the initial phase of the economic recovery, since mid-2015 long-
term unemployment has been falling more rapidly. On a yearly basis, long-term 
unemployment fell by 17.1 per cent in January 2018 and short-term 
unemployment fell by 13.7 per cent. 
 
In September 2014, about 48.2 per cent of the unemployed were long term, the 
highest number in the 2012-2017 period. This compares with 41.5 per cent in 
April 2018. Despite the considerable improvement in recent months, about 23.9 
per cent of the unemployed are in very-long-term-unemployment (three years or 
more). In April 2018, the greater proportion of the very-long-term-unemployed 
were men (61.7 per cent) whose last held occupation was in the craft and related 
 
                                                          
 
29  The Population aged less than 25 years in 2002 was around 1.47 million according to the 2002 Census and in 2016 
was about 1.58 million according the 2016 Census. 
30  With occasional breaks in the data. 
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sector (26.3 per cent) and plant and machine operatives (19.8 per cent). About 
25.4 per cent of all the very-long-term-unemployed are concentrated in the 
Dublin area alone. 
 
Being unemployed for a very long time can have scarring effects on an individual; 
it might not only lead to the loss of human capital and self-confidence but also 
discourage workers out of the labour force.31 These are the workers for whom 
reintegration in the labour market is the most difficult. Despite a supportive 
policy context, as well as the economic recovery, Ireland’s rate of long-term 
unemployment remains high by European standards. 
 
TABLE 4  PERSONS (‘000) ON THE LIVE REGISTER CLASSIFIED BY DURATION 
 2014 M09 2018 M04 
 (‘000s) % (‘000) % 
All durations 369.8  223.6  
Under 1 year 191.5 51.8 130.9 58.5 
1 year and over 178.3 48.2 92.7 41.5 
1 year – less than 2 years 48.8 13.2 24.9 11.1 
2 years – less than 3 years 30.3 8.2 14.3 6.4 
3 years and over 99.2 26.8 53.5 23.9 
 
Source:  Live Register, Central Statistics Office. 
 
In terms of the last occupation held by those on the Live Register in April 2018, 
the occupational group with the largest number of people on the Live Register is 
still the craft and related sectors. However, this sector did register the largest 
decrease over the past year (-17.9 per cent). Based on the CSO’s Monthly 
Unemployment publication,32 the seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate fell to 
5.9 per cent in April 2018. This is the first time since May 2008 that the 
unemployment rate fell below 6.0 per cent.  
 
 
                                                          
 
31  Edin, Per-Andres and Magnus Gustavsson (2008). ‘Time Out of Work and Skill Depreciation.’ Industrial Labor 
Relations Review, 61(2): 163-180. 
Abraham, Catharine G., Kristin Sandusky, John Haltiwanger and James R. Spletzer (2016). ‘The Consequences of Long 
Term Unemployment: Evidence from Matched Employer-Employee Data,’ Working Papers 16-40, Center for 
Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau. 
32  Unemployment rate is based on LFS data (which replaced the old QNHS), with Live Register data used to adjust 
trends for periods for when no LFS data are available. 
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FIGURE 49 SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED UNEMPLOYMENT RATE BY MONTH (%) 
 
Source:  Labour Force Survey, Central Statistics Office. 
 
Employment 
The most recent seasonally-adjusted figures for employment in the Irish economy 
are from the last quarter of 2017. While data for 2018 are as yet unavailable, the 
positive trend in employment is likely to have continued, although at a slower 
pace than in 2017. In the year to the fourth quarter of 2017, 66,500 jobs were 
added (+3.1 per cent), bringing the number of persons in employment to 
2,225,100. The largest year-on-year growth rates were recorded in the 
administrative and support service activities (+15.0 per cent), construction (+9.5 
per cent) and the accommodation and food service activities (+8.7 per cent) 
sectors.  
 
After a period of continued growth, employment in the Irish economy is 
approaching its previous 2007 peak level (2,237,200) and more workers are 
moving from part-time to full-time employment. In the fourth quarter of 2017, 
full-time (seasonally-adjusted) employment increased by 89,900 (+5.4 per cent) 
year-on-year to 1,761,800. Full-time employment now accounts for 79.2 per cent 
of total employment, this compares with 81.1 per cent in the Q4 2007 peak and 
74.8 per cent in the Q3 2013 downturn. On the other hand, part-time 
employment fell by 23,000 (-4.7 per cent) to 461,500 and now accounts for 20.7 
per cent of total employment. 
 
Overall employment rates33 (67.7 per cent) are still below the 2007 levels (71.8 
per cent) but above those in the early 2000s (64.5 per cent). Nonetheless, there 
are considerable disparities between gender and skills groups (Table 5 and Table 
6). Employment rates are particularly low among the low educated (36.9 per 
 
                                                          
 
33  Defined as the proportion of the working age population that is in employment. 
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cent) and they remain significantly below the 2000 and 2007 employment rates 
(48.1 and 52.4 per cent respectively). 
 
Across all the educational levels, the gender gap in employment rates has been 
closing. In 2000, the gap in employment rates between men and women was 22.5 
percentage points, in 2007 the gap was 17.5 percentage points and in 2017 it was 
10.6 percentage points. While this signals positive developments in the labour 
market, employment rates among less educated females within the labour force 
are considerably lower; only 25.6 per cent of women with lower secondary 
education or less are in employment, 20.3 percentage points below the rate for 
men with similar education levels. The gender gap in employment rates 
decreases as the level of education increases; 80.9 per cent of women with 
tertiary education are in employment compared with 88.8 of men. 
 
TABLE 5 EMPLOYMENT RATES (15-64 YEARS) BY GENDER AND EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 
LEVEL (%) 
Gender Education levels  2000 2007 2017 
Total 
All Education levels  64.5 71.8 67.7 
Lower secondary or below 48.1 52.4 36.9 
Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary 72.6 76.8 67.9 
Tertiary 86.5 86.7 84.5 
Male 
All Education levels  75.7 80.4 73.0 
Lower secondary or below 62.8 65.0 45.9 
Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary 84.3 86.9 75.4 
Tertiary 91.2 91.4 88.8 
Female 
All Education levels  53.2 62.9 62.4 
Lower secondary or below 31.7 37.4 25.6 
Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary 61.9 66.8 60.2 
Tertiary 81.3 82.8 80.9 
 
Sources:  Labour Force Survey, Central Statistics Office, Eurostat. 
 
Overall employment rates in Ireland are similar to the average among European 
Union countries. Employment rates among the young (15-24 years) and the older 
(55-64 years) are higher in Ireland than the EU average, although prime age 
workers (25-54 years) face lower employment rates. The difference in 
employment rates between people with lower secondary education or less and 
upper secondary or tertiary education are considerably higher in Ireland (31.0 
percentage point gap between lower secondary or below and upper secondary 
and 47.6 between lower secondary or below and tertiary) when compared to the 
EU average (25.4 and 38.5 percentage points). This is particularly true among 
young adults; the gap between low education and tertiary education is 68.3 
percentage points in Ireland, while in the EU it is 42.0 percentage points. 
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TABLE 6  2017 EMPLOYMENT RATES BY AGE GROUP AND EDUCATIONAL (%), IRELAND AND 
EU28 
  Ireland EU 
All Education levels 
Total (15-64 years) 67.7 67.6 
From 15 to 24 years 40.0 34.7 
From 25 to 54 years 77.9 79.6 
From 55 to 64 years 58.6 57.1 
Lower secondary or below 
Total (15-64 years) 36.9 45.5 
From 15 to 24 years 10.3 18.9 
From 25 to 54 years 53.9 62.0 
From 55 to 64 years 46.3 42.3 
Upper secondary and post-
secondary non-tertiary 
Total (15-64 years) 67.9 70.9 
From 15 to 24 years 54.0 46.1 
From 25 to 54 years 74.5 81.1 
From 55 to 64 years 61.4 59.0 
Tertiary 
Total (15-64 years) 84.5 84.0 
From 15 to 24 years 78.6 60.9 
From 25 to 54 years 87.1 88.1 
From 55 to 64 years 70.1 72.5 
 
Sources:  Labour Force Survey, Central Statistics Office, Eurostat. 
 
While Ireland performs well in terms of educational attainment, with one of the 
highest levels of tertiary qualifications in the EU,34 the disparities in the 
employment rates35, 36 and other labour market outcomes across individuals with 
different educational attainments could be suggestive of a skills mismatch in the 
Irish economy.37 This might be related to the change in the composition of 
economic activity since the pre-financial crisis years. Employment in the 
construction sector remains 42.6 per cent below its peak level in 2007 and 
employment in the information and communication sector is up by 33.1 per cent 
over the same period. Employment in administrative and support services was 
also particularly hit by the crisis and still remains significantly below its peak level. 
Employment in education services, on the other hand, seems to have grown 
significantly over recent years. 
 
The National Skills Bulletin 201738 finds that skills shortages exist for certain 
occupations across all sectors, although many of these are small in magnitude or 
 
                                                          
 
34  European Commission, 2017. ‘Country Report Ireland – including an in-depth review on the prevention and 
correction of macroeconomic imbalances’, Brussels, 7.2.2018, SWD (2018) 206 final. 
35  Skills mismatch measured according to European Commission methodology; European Commission (2015). 
‘Measuring Skills Mismatch’, European Commission Analytical Web Note 7/2015).  
36  See McGuinness, S., P., Konstantinos and P. Redmond (2017). ‘How Useful Is the Concept of Skills Mismatch?,’ IZA 
Discussion Papers 10786, IZA) which addresses the shortcomings of this measure. 
37  IMF (2018). ‘Ireland : Selected Issues’, Country Report No. 17/172, International Monetary Fund. 
38  Report by the Skills and Labour Market Research Unit (SLMRU) in SOLAS on behalf of the National Skills Council. The 
Bulletin is based on data held in the SLMRU National Skills Database, spans 130 occupational groups and examines a 
range of labour market indicators. 
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in niche areas. The report highlights challenges in areas such as ICT, engineering, 
healthcare, business and finance. 
 
Recent qualitative market-based survey data also provide some indication of skills 
shortages. According to the Hays Ireland Salary and Recruiting Trends 2018 guide, 
more than three-quarters of Irish companies have experienced a ‘moderate’ or 
‘extreme’ skills shortage in 2017 – the majority in ICT, life sciences and 
construction. Some of these shortages are being met through migration and 
investment in training and education. 
 
While Ireland does not exhibit human capital deficits, skill shortages in fast-
growing sectors are starting to emerge and challenges to the employment of low 
skilled individuals persist. 
 
Labour market forecasts 
As the Irish economy is approaching full employment (around 5 per cent) we 
continue to expect the unemployment rate to decline, but at a slower pace than 
in the previous quarters. Given the latest review of the CSO labour market 
figures, we believe that the unemployment rate will average 5.6 per cent through 
2018 and 5.0 per cent through 2019. Employment is set to exceed 2.25 million by 
the end of 2018 and to increase to 2.29 million by the end of 2019. 
 
PUBLIC FINANCES 
Exchequer receipts for the first five months of 2018 illustrate that the public 
finances continue to demonstrate resilient growth into the present year. Overall, 
taxation receipts are up almost 3.6 per cent compared with the same time in 
2017, with income tax growing by 5.8 per cent over the period. Figure 50 
summarises the annual changes in some of the main tax sub-components over 
the period 2014 to the present. 
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FIGURE 50 ANNUAL CHANGES IN MAJOR TAX SUB-COMPONENTS (%)  
 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
 
While VAT receipts have only witnessed a relatively modest increase for the 
current year at 1.6 per cent, pay related social insurance, which is closely 
correlated with developments in the labour market, saw an increase of 4.7 per 
cent for the opening five months of the year compared with the same period in 
2017. 
 
In Table 7 the latest trends in actual Government expenditure are compared with 
the profile or expected levels for the current year. 
 
TABLE 7  ACTUAL AND PROFILE GROSS GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE: JANUARY – APRIL 
(€ MILLION) 
Current Capital 
Actual Profile Actual Profile 
18,084 17,892 1,132 1,398 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
 
On the current side, it can be seen that both actual and expected expenditure are 
quite close, however there is somewhat of a difference between the actual and 
expected capital expenditure. The difference can be traced to expenditure on 
‘Housing Planning and Local Government’ where actual expenditure for the year 
to date is €207 million – somewhat less than the expected amount of €365 
million. If this trend continues for the year, it may indicate that the Government 
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is encountering difficulties in spending allocated resources for one of the most 
pressing current social and economic issues – the provision of social housing. 
 
A notable increase in expenditure for the year to date is the higher EU budget 
contribution, which is primarily as a result of Ireland’s increased share of the EU 
budget obligations. As the fastest growing economy in the EU over the past 
number of years, it is inevitable that Ireland’s contribution would increase; 
however the issues surrounding the National Accounts, outlined in the Special 
Article by FitzGerald (2018), may be distorting the scale of the contribution. 
 
The issues concerning the National Accounts are also impacting the degree of 
fiscal space available to the Government. Because of the recent very high growth 
rates in GDP and based on the agreed methodology of the European Union, the 
output gap estimated for Ireland is strongly positive this year. The resulting 
structural deficit means that Ireland is now unlikely to formally exit the medium-
term objective (MTO), the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact, until 
2019 and not 2018 as previously expected. This means that while there is an 
increase in the fiscal space available to the Government, it is not as large as 
previously envisaged.  
 
Figure 51 presents the debt ratio for both GDP and the new GNI* measure. Given 
GNI* is a more appropriate measure of the welfare of Irish inhabitants, the higher 
levels of indebtedness noted by this measure point to the potential vulnerabilities 
if the cost of borrowing were to rise. 
 
FIGURE 51 DEBT-TO-GDP AND GNI*RATIOS (%) 
 
Source:  QEC calculations.  
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General Assessment 
 
Most key domestic economic indicators for 2018 suggest the Irish economy looks 
set to register another strong performance in the present year. While the pace of 
decline in unemployment has slowed to some degree, taxation receipts across all 
the major headings, along with other sentiment indicators, indicate that 
economic activity is still increasing significantly. The relatively strong performance 
of the global economy also ensures that external demand for goods and services 
produced in Ireland has increased somewhat in 2018.  
 
The ongoing resurgence of the Irish economy serves as the important backdrop to 
the formulation of the budgetary process. The recent publication of the stability 
programme update details the outline of the Government’s fiscal strategy for the 
coming years. This comes at a time when the discretion available to the 
Government in terms of ‘fiscal space’ is increased considerably relative to 
previous years. As noted in previous Commentaries, this greater discretion 
applies at a time when the foremost policy challenge is transitioning the economy 
from the substantial rates of growth synonymous with an economy experiencing 
a rapid recovery to more sustainable rates of growth over the medium term. 
 
It is clear that there are growing demands on the public purse; the Government 
formally launched the National Development Plan earlier in the year where 
significant increases in capital expenditure are envisaged over the medium term. 
Also, the significant hardship experienced by many in the aftermath of the 
2007/2008 financial crisis has resulted in some calls now for reductions in rates of 
personal taxation. 
 
To inform some of this discussion, in a Box in the present Commentary, Garcia-
Rodriguez uses the ESRI structural model of the Irish economy, COSMO, to 
examine the implications of two different but related fiscal scenarios, both of 
which would cost the Exchequer approximately the same amount. Garcia-
Rodriguez compares the impact of an increase in capital expenditure associated 
with the recent National Development Plan (NDP) with a reduction in personal 
taxation rates on a number of key economic variables. In particular, the Box 
focuses on the impact of the two scenarios on economic activity.  
 
Overall both scenarios increase the level of activity in the economy and result in a 
sharper decline in unemployment relative to the baseline scenario. The results 
suggest that while the increase in public investment leads to a more positive 
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impact on economic activity and employment, the tax cut produces a greater 
increase in consumption and a more balanced impact in sectoral terms. The full 
impact of the investment scenario will be heavily dependent on the details of any 
such plan, however focussing on investment does have the advantage of being 
able to target a number of different policy objectives such as regional 
development. A universal reduction in taxation rates clearly does not have that 
versatility in terms of meeting multiple policy goals.  
 
From a more general perspective, it is clear that the investment scenario 
increases economic activity through rising potential output levels, whereas the 
impact of the taxation scenario mainly operates via increasing consumption. 
Given the very strong domestic performance at present, it is imperative that fiscal 
policy does not risk overheating the domestic economy. Therefore, given the 
Government’s commitment to the NDP in the medium term, it would appear 
there is little or no scope for taxation policy to additionally stimulate the Irish 
economy. 
 
Continuing on the theme of the public finances, in a Special Article to the 
Commentary, Doorley, Callan, Regan and Walsh (2018), using the SWITCH model, 
examine the tax treatment of pension contributions. They simulate a number of 
reforms to the current tax treatment of pensions including a halving of the cap on 
tax relief and a switch to a standardised rate of relief. The scenarios suggest that 
up to 46 per cent of the total cost of tax relief on pension contributions could be 
saved before behavioural responses are allowed for. In all scenarios, richer 
households lose the most from any reform but losses are minimal in the case of 
altering the cap on tax relief. In the case of standardisation of tax relief, richer 
households lose much more than poorer ones leading to a convergence in the 
distribution of gains from tax relief.  
 
Given the role that developments in credit markets played in conjunction with 
fiscal imbalances, a growing literature (Borio et al., 2016)39 assesses the impact of 
financial booms and busts – financial cycles – on fiscal sustainability. In an Irish 
context, it is particularly important to examine the inter-relationship between 
fiscal sustainability and the financial cycle at any point in time. At present, as 
noted in the monetary and financial section, mortgage credit levels are growing 
significantly. While overall stocks of credit are still significantly below pre-2008 
peak levels, it is evident that increasing house prices, coupled with growing levels 
of disposable income are likely to see further increases in the extension of such 
credit. This likely increase in future household credit levels is a further reason for 
the Government to exercise caution in the formulation of fiscal policy. 
 
                                                          
 
39  Borio, C., M. Lombardi and F. Zampolli (2016). ‘Fiscal sustainability and the financial cycle’, Bank for International 
Settlements, BIS Working Paper No. 552. 
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The ongoing political difficulties in forming an Italian Government and the 
increase in popularity of parties there who are sceptical about the European 
Union is a potential risk to the Irish economy. Continued uncertainty as to the 
future of the European Union, whether through Brexit or issues in other Member 
States, highlights the exposed nature of the Irish economy to external trade. This 
exposure is further accentuated given the present volatile trade relations 
between the US and China. As noted in previous Commentaries, any reduction in 
global economic activity has a direct impact on the domestic economy. 
 
In a further Special Article to the Commentary Fitzgerald (2018) discusses the 
complications for the Irish National Accounts of the increasingly globalised 
economy. Although this issue has received considerable attention recently, 
Fitzgerald focuses, in particular, on the challenges posed by the treatment of 
intellectual capital in national accounting frameworks. The sheer scale of this 
factor of production allied to the ease with which it can be transferred across 
countries, especially in response to changes in taxation treatments, can result in 
substantial variations in year-to-year values in the National Accounts of particular 
countries. To more accurately capture how changes in the economy impact on 
the welfare of Irish residents, Fitzgerald (2018), similar to what was argued for in 
the previous Commentary, calls for the preparation of a satellite set of Irish 
National Accounts. 
 
The recent publication by the CSO of ‘Productivity in Ireland 2016’ provides a 
highly important breakdown of productivity developments in the Irish economy 
between the foreign and the domestic dominated sectors. This enables trends in 
labour and multi-factor productivity to be compared between the foreign-owned 
multinational enterprise dominated sector and for other sectors excluding the 
foreign-owned category. As demonstrated in the Output section of the 
Commentary, combining labour productivity rates in the non-foreign owned 
sector with observed increases in employment results in an estimate of output 
growth, which appears more plausible than headline GDP and GNP figures. 
Therefore, the provision of a more granular breakdown in economic data 
between the foreign dominated and the indigenous sectors of the domestic 
economy is essential in understanding how changes in key economic variables 
impact the livelihoods of Irish residents. 
 
 DETAILED FORECAST TABLES 
 
  
 FORECAST TABLE A1 EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
 
2016 % change in 2017 2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 194.1 0.1 2.9 194.3 4.1 3.1 202.3 5.9 3.3 214.2 
Tourism 4.7 5.5 4.2 4.9 3.0 3.0 5.1 3.2 3.2 5.3 
Other Services 136.3 13.8 13.3 156.2 14.2 13.4 171.5 14.4 13.5 186.3 
Exports of Goods and Services 335.0 6.1 6.9 355.4 6.6 5.4 378.8 7.1 5.2 405.8 
FISM Adjustment 0.0     0.0     -0.2     -0.2 
Adjusted Exports 335.0 6.1 6.9 335.4 6.5 5.4 378.6 7.1 5.2 405.5 
 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A2 INVESTMENT 
 
2016 % change in 2017 2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Housing 5.2 26.7 16.0 6.6 67.1 24.8 11.0 23.6 21.1 13.6 
Other Building 10.3 22.3 18.7 12.6 26.6 20.0 15.9 28.7 22.0 20.5 
Transfer Costs 1.1 0.9 -1.1 1.1 9.2 3.0 1.2 9.2 3.0 1.4 
Building and Construction 17.7 21.4 15.8 21.5 37.7 20.1 29.6 25.7 20.5 37.2 
Machinery and Equipment 70.0 -33.6 -31.6 46.4 13.8 10.1 52.8 13.9 10.2 60.2 
Total Investment 87.7 -20.8 -22.3 69.4 18.7 13.0 82.4 18.1 13.4 97.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 FORECAST TABLE A3 PERSONAL INCOME 
 
2016 % change in 2017 2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 
 
€ bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn 
Agriculture, etc. 3.2 2.0 0.1 3.3 2.5 0.1 3.4 1.4 0.0 3.4 
Non-Agricultural Wages 80.3 5.2 4.2 84.4 5.3 4.5 88.9 5.4 4.8 93.7 
Other Non-Agricultural Income 22.5 29.2 6.6 29.0 20.9 6.1 35.1 21.4 7.5 42.6 
Total Income Received 105.9 10.2 10.8 116.7 9.1 10.6 127.4 9.7 12.4 139.7 
Current Transfers 23.6 0.3 0.1 23.6 -7.8 -1.8 21.8 -2.4 -0.5 21.3 
Gross Personal Income 129.5 8.4 10.9 140.4 6.3 8.8 149.2 7.9 11.8 161.0 
Direct Personal Taxes 29.4 4.2 1.2 30.6 3.8 1.2 31.8 3.4 1.1 32.9 
Personal Disposable Income 100.1 9.6 9.6 109.8 7.6 3.4 117.4 9.1 10.7 128.1 
Consumption 96.6 3.2 3.1 99.7 3.4 3.4 103.1 3.5 3.6 106.8 
Personal Savings 3.5 185.0 6.5 10.0 41.8 4.2 14.2 49.9 7.1 21.3 
Savings Ratio 3.5 
  
9.1   12.1   16.7 
Average Personal Tax Rate 22.6 
  
21.8   22.1   20.3 
 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A4 IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES  
 
2016 % change in 2017 2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 88.2 -1.4 -4.3 86.9 7.2 5.0 93.2 5.9 7.0 98.7 
Tourism 5.6 4.9 1.9 5.9 4.7 3.2 6.2 5.4 3.8 6.5 
Other Services 180.6 -7.3 -10.0 167.4 12.7 8.4 188.8 12.5 8.2 212.4 
Imports of Goods and Services 274.4 -5.2 -6.2 260.3 10.7 7.0 288.1 10.2 7.7 317.6 
FISM Adjustment 0.0 
  
0.0   -0.4   -0.4 
Adjusted Imports 274.4 -5.2 -6.2 260.3 10.6 7.0 287.7 10.2 7.7 317.2 
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FORECAST TABLE A5 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
 
2016 2017 2018 2019 
 
€ bn € bn € bn € bn 
Exports of Goods and Services 335.0 355.4 378.8 405.8 
Imports of Goods and Services 274.4 260.3 288.1 317.6 
Net Factor Payments -47.6 -53.8 -55.1 -57.2 
Net Transfers -3.8 -4.3 -4.8 -5.3 
Balance on Current Account 9.2 37.1 30.8 25.7 
As a % of GNP 4.1 15.4 11.8 9.1 
 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A6 EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT, ANNUAL AVERAGE 
 
2016 2017 2018 2019 
 
‘000 ‘000 ‘000 ‘000 
Agriculture 113.3 110.6 114.7 114.7 
Industry 394.7 411.6 427.0 437.8 
Of which: Construction 118.9 128.4 140.1 148.3 
Services 1,618.2 1,664.9 1,706.2 1,733.4 
Total at Work 2,133.3 2,194.5 2,247.9 2,286.0 
Unemployed 194.8 157.8 134.3 119.6 
Labour Force 2,327.9 2,353.3 2,382.2 2,405.6 
Unemployment Rate, % 8.4 6.7 5.6 5.0 
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THE TAX TREATMENT OF PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS IN IRELAND1   
Karina Doorley, Tim Callan, Mark Regan and John R. Walsh*  
ABSTRACT 
Tax treatments of pensions vary widely across countries. This paper examines the 
current tax treatment of pension contributions in Ireland and some widely 
discussed alternatives, including equalising the tax relief available to low and high 
earners. The analysis takes into account both explicit contributions in the private 
sector, and the implicit value of publicly funded pensions. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Most OECD countries are facing the ‘twin challenge of ensuring both the 
adequacy and financial sustainability’ of their pension systems (OECD, 2014). 
Ageing populations, falling fertility rates and stagnating employment levels mean 
that funding the income of the elderly by using taxes paid by the working age 
population is becoming more and more difficult. Similar pressures affect Ireland 
although its relatively high fertility rate does afford some advantage compared to 
many European countries. 
 
Calls for reform of both public and private pension systems in Ireland have been 
frequent over the last decades and have come from many sources. The OECD, 
while acknowledging that Ireland is better positioned than many countries, 
recommends that Ireland ‘continue to adapt and fine-tune its pension system so 
that it can provide affordable and adequate benefits to Irish retirees in the long 
term’. Collins and Hughes (2017) also call for reform of the pension system, 
questioning the effectiveness of the current set of policy instruments focused on 
getting people to save for their retirement. Reform of State pension entitlement 
is already under way. The retirement age has increased from 65 to 66, and 
further increases – to 67 in 2021 and 68 in 2028 – have been announced and 
passed in legislation. 
 
                                                          
 
1  This paper represents a development of work initially conducted for the Pensions Council. We thank the Council for 
initiating this project, and Council members Helen McDonald and Shane Whelan for helpful comments. We thank 
Gerry Reilly and the SILC team at the CSO for access to SILC data on which the SWITCH tax-benefit model is based. 
* Karina Doorley is Research Officer at the Economic and Social Research Institute, Research Fellow at the Institute of 
Labor Economics and Adjunct Lecturer at Trinity College Dublin. Tim Callan is Research Professor at the Economic and 
Social Research Institute, Research Fellow at the Institute of Labor Economics and Adjunct Professor at Trinity College 
Dublin. Mark Regan is Research Assistant and John Walsh is Senior Research Analyst at the Economic and Social 
Research Institute.  
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State pensions in Ireland are not earnings related. As a result, the attainment of 
adequate replacement of employment income depends, for those on middle and 
higher incomes, on being supplemented by private pensions. Policy instruments 
which can encourage such private sector provision include both tax incentives 
and, potentially, legislative provisions regarding the availability of pension 
schemes to employees, and the manner of their operation. These can range from 
making membership of a pension scheme mandatory, to arrangements by which 
membership is automatic unless individuals opt out of the scheme. 
 
In this paper we focus on the tax treatment of pension contributions, which 
forms an important element of the overall tax treatment of pensions through 
pension contributions, investment income from pensions, and pensions in 
payment. This is a partial view of the overall territory, but offers some new 
insights. It does not lead directly to policy recommendations; several other 
factors would need to be taken into account in order to reach such conclusions. 
 
There is wide variation the tax treatment of pension contributions across 
countries. Whitehouse (1999 and 2000) sets out four distinct options, 
characterised by whether or not contributions, pension fund income, and 
payments of pensions are taxable (T) or exempt (E). The current tax treatment of 
pensions in Ireland can be characterised as broadly following the principle that 
contributions are exempt from income tax. Pension fund income, which is the 
investment income derived from them, is also exempt, while income received 
from a pension is taxable in the normal way. Such an approach is not uncommon 
internationally and is labelled EET as contributions are Exempt, investment 
income is Exempt, and pensions in payment are Taxed. In the Irish system, there 
is a deviation from the strict EET framework, as lump sum payments at 
retirement are also exempted from tax. Whitehouse characterises EET as an 
expenditure tax, which could also be achieved under a TEE regime, taxing 
contributions on entry, but leaving pension fund income and pensions in payment 
exempt from tax. About half of the countries surveyed by Whitehouse (2000) had 
tax regimes which approximated an expenditure tax, or were more favourable to 
pensions than that. 
 
However, the other half of the countries surveyed had tax treatments closer to 
the comprehensive income tax approach, either TTE or ETT. Given this wide 
variation in country practice, there is no single standard approach to the tax 
treatment of pensions which commands universal acceptance. Our analysis 
focuses solely on potential changes to the tax treatment of contributions. Thus, in 
the Irish context, we can contrast the impact of the current system – with 
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pension contributions exempt from tax – with alternatives where pension 
contributions are fully subject to tax, or have more restricted relief (e.g., through 
standardisation or hybridisation of the relief). It is not within the scope of this 
paper to move further to a full consideration of a move from EET to TEE (the 
prepaid expenditure tax) or TTE (one version of the comprehensive income tax). 
Nevertheless, the insights from this partial analysis of changes to the tax 
treatment of pensions may be of assistance in the broader debate regarding the 
tax treatment of pensions and alternative means (such as auto-enrolment) for 
the encouragement of pension savings. 
 
The Irish system exempts private pension contributions from income tax through 
its EET approach. EET systems are generally considered to result in higher pension 
contributions than TEE (Taxed, Exempt, Exempt) systems (Armstrong, 
2015).There is limited evidence that this kind of tax relief is cost effective in 
incentivising individuals or households to save for retirement. Rather, findings 
from international policy reforms indicate that when these incentives are 
introduced or removed, households divert private savings into pension 
contributions or vice versa (Attanasio and Rohwedder, 2003; Attanasio et al., 
2004; Chetty et al., 2014). Benjamin (2003) estimates that one-quarter of the 
savings under the US scheme known as 401(k) represents new national savings. In 
addition to this, households who normally save the most were found to be largely 
contributing funds that they would have saved anyway. This suggests that tax 
incentives for pension contributions face a ‘deadweight’ problem, whereby they 
subsidise savings that would have taken place anyway and this seems to be 
particularly so for those at higher incomes.  
 
As the tax relief afforded in Ireland is at the individual’s marginal tax rate, this 
makes it more beneficial to those with higher earnings. Potential paths to 
restructuring tax incentives for pension contributions were discussed in the 
Green Paper on Pensions (Department of Social and Family Affairs, 2007). Among 
other reforms suggested, equalising the tax relief available to low and high 
earners was considered in order to increase the financial incentive for low 
earners to make pension contributions. Callan et al. (2009) and Collins and 
Hughes (2018) also discuss the distributional implications of the provision of tax 
relief at the individual’s marginal tax rate: the research reported here provides a 
more up-to-date picture, and examines the distributional implications of a move 
to alternative forms of tax relief such as standard rating of the relief.  
 
Pension funds are exempt from income and capital gains tax while pension 
income is subject to partial taxation on withdrawal from the fund. Estimates of 
the revenue foregone due to tax relief on pension contributions are available 
from The Revenue Commissioners but should be interpreted with some caution. 
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These estimates quantify the revenue foregone from exempting pension 
contributions from taxation, without adjustment for the change in pension 
contribution and investment behaviour that such a switch would result in. 
Nevertheless, the TET system provides a useful benchmark system against which 
we measure some reform scenarios – but the TET system is not proposed here as 
a policy reform. According to the Revenue Commissioners (2013), comparing the 
current EET Irish system with a hypothetical TET system yields a revenue 
foregone figure of approximately €1.3 billion.  
 
In this report we:  
• Quantify the cost of tax relief on private, occupational and public pension 
contributions relative to a scenario with no tax relief on pension 
contributions (i.e. a TET scenario). These calculations are on a similar basis to 
those undertaken by Revenue, and subject to the same limitations and 
qualifications; 
• Simulate the cost of changing the structure of tax relief by simulating a lower 
cap on tax relief and by investigating a standard rate relief and a hybrid rate 
relief; 
• Simulate the distributional consequences of such reforms; 
• Discuss potential behavioural responses to any reforms. 
 
THE IRISH PENSION SYSTEM 
The Irish public pension system consists of a basic public pension, complemented 
by a means-tested non-contributory pension. There is no earnings-related pillar 
or any mandatory occupational or personal pension. This makes voluntary 
contributions to private pension plans a very important overall component of 
retirement income. However, more than 50 per cent of workers do not make 
private pension contributions or do so during only part of their working careers 
(OECD, 2014).  
 
In a measure designed to promote complementary pension participation, 
contributions made by employees to public, private or occupational pension 
schemes are deductible for income tax purposes and tax relief is applied at the 
individual’s marginal income tax rate. The amount of employee contributions that 
can be tax-relieved is limited to an age-related percentage amount of the 
employee’s remuneration. Since 2011, tax-relievable contributions are subject to 
an annual earnings cap of €115,000 (€150,000 in 2010 and €250,000 prior to 
that). Employer contributions are also deductible in computing the employer’s 
profits. 
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Pension fund investments are generally exempt from tax on their capital gains 
and income. A temporary pension levy (introduced in 2011) taxed the entire 
accumulated fund but was phased out in 2016. Pension income is taxable on 
withdrawal as income at the individual’s marginal income tax rate although 
individuals can take tax-free lump sums. Debate about the tax treatment of 
pensions sometimes refers to the idea that the EET system involves a ‘deferral’ of 
taxation to the final stage, when pensions are in payment. Whelan and Hally 
(2018) argue that Ireland’s current, broadly EET system recoups a rather small 
proportion of the tax which would be raised under an alternative TTE system. 
Essentially, this contrast is between the higher revenue from a comprehensive 
income tax system (TTE), and the lower revenue from an expenditure tax 
approach (EET or the prepaid expenditure tax TEE). Cremer and Pestieau (2016) 
note that ‘the optimal policy is in general neither TEE nor TTE and which of these 
regimes is preferable is not clear’. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
SWITCH  
Our analysis uses SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model, linked to data from SILC 
(Survey of Income and Living Conditions), the Central Statistics Office’s (CSO) 
main survey of household income.2 SILC is an annual survey conducted since 2003 
by the CSO in order to obtain information regarding the income and living 
conditions of Irish households. It is the Irish component of an EU-wide survey 
which aims to capture information on poverty and social exclusion across Europe. 
The survey is cross-sectional and also has a panel dimension with households 
surveyed annually. The SWITCH database is currently based on a pooled sample 
of households from the 2013 and 2014 waves of SILC.3 The SWITCH database 
contains almost 8,000 households or over 20,000 individuals.  
 
SWITCH simulates the disposable income each family would obtain under the 
current set of income tax and social welfare policies as well as in a counterfactual 
‘what-if’ scenario. For this analysis, SWITCH is used to simulate: 
• disposable income in the ‘baseline’ scenario, i.e. using the existing 2017 tax 
and benefit rules; 
• disposable income in the absence of any tax relief on pension contributions; 
• disposable income under alternative tax treatments of pension contributions. 
 
 
                                                          
 
2  See Callan et al. (2013) for a full description of the model. 
3  The sample of households used to construct the SWITCH database contains all households from the 2014 survey, and 
all additional households from the 2013 survey that were not interviewed in the 2014 survey. This ensures that 
households that were interviewed for both the 2013 and 2014 waves of SILC are present only once in the SWITCH 
database.  
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Estimating pension contributions  
SILC data contain information about the existence and amount of pension 
contributions made by an individual from their last wage, including amounts paid 
to personal pension plans such as Retirement Annuity Contracts (RACs) and 
Personal Retirement Savings Accounts (PRSAs). For current purposes – the 
examination of tax relief related to pension contributions – we judge that it is 
best to exclude the ‘Pension-related Deduction’ (PRD) from the analysis. PRD was 
introduced in March 2009 for public service employees. The deduction is 
calculated on gross income and is treated as a pension contribution with tax relief 
provided at the marginal rate. However, the deduction does not affect the overall 
threshold levels for tax relief on pension contributions. We exclude PRD from the 
analysis because PRD is not, in fact, a contribution which increases an individual’s 
pension entitlement. In our view, it is more correctly treated as a mechanism 
designed to reduce payroll costs and net wages. The PRD is paid by the employee, 
this attracts a tax relief, and the net impact is a saving to the State and a 
reduction in disposable income. The level of PRD was chosen with the level of 
State saving, and hence reduction in disposable income, in mind. If the tax status 
of PRD were changed so that it no longer attracted tax relief, then the desired 
outcome could have been achieved with a smaller PRD contribution. This element 
does not really belong in the broader debate about the treatment of genuine 
pension contributions, which do raise retirement income. 
 
For those who indicate that they make a contribution from their wage, we take 
the reported amount, less any PRD. For those who report that they make a 
contribution from their wage, but do not report the amount of the deduction, we 
assume a contribution equal to the average contribution within their age group4 
and income quartile. There is no direct information on the amount of 
contributions by employers. Employer contributions are, therefore, imputed for 
those individuals who are covered by an occupational pension. Employer 
contributions are calculated as 8 per cent of employee gross earnings for all 
employees who contribute to a pension and state that their employer also 
contributes. This method is in line with how the Central Statistics Office estimates 
employer pension contributions. It also brings the total (employee + employer) 
average contribution to around 15 per cent, which was found to be the 
approximate average in previous work on this topic (Callan et al., 2008). Self-
employed pension contributions are reported in the data and relate to 
contributions to individual private pension plans.  
 
We distinguish between public and private sector workers using the individual’s 
self-reported status. The public sector scheme is designed on a pay-as-you-go 
 
                                                          
 
4  The age groups include: <30; 30-39; 40-49; 50-59; >=60. 
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basis and therefore not funded on explicit contributions. However, we attribute 
value to the government’s implicit contribution. The rationale for this is explained 
more fully in Callan et al. (2007), and a similar point is also made by the Irish 
Association of Pension Funds IAPF (2008). If explicit contributions made by 
employees and employers were to become taxable at any point, then the tax-free 
status of the State’s implicit contribution would lead to a horizontal inequity. The 
accrual of pension benefits would be similar to ‘benefit-in-kind’ for public sector 
workers and the question of how to value and tax this benefit would arise. In our 
work, we try to incorporate the value of the implicit public service pension 
contributions in a similar way to the explicit contributions of employers and 
employees in the private sector. The Report of the Public Service Benchmarking 
Body (2007) includes a special study on the relative value of public and private 
sector pensions.5 Based on this, we assign an implicit employer contribution from 
the State of 20 per cent of gross income, minus employee contributions.6 
 
RESULTS 
Scale of pension tax relief 
We begin by examining the aggregate extent of tax relief as estimated by 
SWITCH. In order to do so, we adopt the same framework as in Revenue 
estimates of the cost of pension tax reliefs i.e. the scale of tax relief is measured 
by the increase in revenue attained by moving from an EET system to a TET 
system. This analysis is a purely technical construct: it does not imply that a TET 
system is an appropriate one. It gives some information, but not a complete 
picture, of the changes involved in moving to a TEE (prepaid expenditure tax) or a 
TTE (comprehensive income tax) system.7 More specific potential reforms, which 
have been considered in the Green Paper on pensions (DSP, 2007) are examined 
in the next section.  
 
Table 1 shows the total cost of tax relief on private pension contributions i.e. the 
additional cost of an EET system compared to a TET system. We focus on 
simulations for 2017 but also report simulations from 2013 which can be 
compared to the latest publicly available Revenue Commissioners’ data. In 2017, 
the cost of tax relief on pension contributions is estimated to be in the region of 
€2.2 billion. Of this figure, most of the cost relates to tax relief on employee 
 
                                                          
 
5  The introduction of the Single Public Service Pension Scheme for new entrants to the public sector from 2013 will 
affect the implicit contribution rate of the State for those subject to it. While this could be addressed in further work, 
the main impacts are well captured in the current analysis attributing the 20 per cent contribution to all staff, 
because the numbers of new entrants since 2013 is small in data collected in 2013 and 2014. 
6  If we were to include PRD in the contribution of the public sector employee, the amount of the imputed government 
contribution would decrease mechanically as it is calculated as 20 per cent of gross employee income minus 
employee contributions. This alternative method would result in no overall change to the total cost of tax relief or to 
its distributional implications. 
7  As noted earlier, these characterisations of potential future systems are related to arguments concerning the extent 
of ‘deferred taxation’. 
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contributions (€729 million) and government contributions (€778 million), but 
employer contributions also account for €541 million, and the cost of tax relief on 
pension contributions of the self-employed is estimated at around €185 million. 
 
TABLE 1 ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES OF TAX RELIEF ON PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS 
  SWITCH 2013 SWITCH 2017 Revenue Commissioners 2013 
Employee Contributions 653 729 552 
Employer Contributions 486 541 497 
Personal Pensions 155 185 211 
Sub-total 1,295 1,455 1,260 
Government Contributions 764 778  
Overall Total 2,058 2,232  
 
Source:  SWITCH 2013 results based on 2013 policies used with 2013 SILC. SWITCH 2017 results based on 2017 policies used with pooled 
2013-2014 data. Revenue Commissioners figures taken from Revenue Commissioners on-line statistics 
(https://www.revenue.ie/en/corporate/documents/statistics/tax-expenditures/costs-tax-expenditures.pdf). 
 
TABLE 2  ESTIMATES OF TAX RELIEF ON PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS BY SECTOR 
 SWITCH 2017 
Private sector (employee + employer) 935 
Public sector (employee + government) 1,112 
Personal pensions 185 
Total 2,232 
 
Source:  SWITCH 2017 results based on 2017 policies used with pooled 2013-2014 data. 
 
We can also look at the split of tax relief between the public and private sector. 
Table 2 shows that employee and employer tax relief in the private sector 
accounts for almost half of the total cost at €935 million. Tax relief on employee 
and government contributions in the public sector account for a further €1.1 
billion. 
 
From our simulations, we can also identify how gains from this tax relief are 
distributed. Figure 1 shows the pattern of gains and clearly indicates that higher 
earners benefit more from tax relief on pension contributions than lower earners. 
The top four deciles of the income distribution gain between 3-4.5 per cent of 
disposable income due to tax relief on pension contributions. Gains are more 
modest around the middle of the income distribution (1-2 per cent) and there is 
virtually no impact for the bottom three deciles. This pattern of gains is similar to 
that reported by Collins and Hughes (2017) for employer and employee pension 
contributions. 
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FIGURE 1  THE DIFFERENCE IN HOUSEHOLD DISPOSABLE INCOME BY DECILE DUE TO TAX 
RELIEF ON PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS 
  
 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations using SWITCH 2017 policies linked to pooled 2013-2014 SILC data. 
 
Lastly, Table 3 looks at the pattern of gains by family type. Overall, tax relief on 
pension contributions leads to an average gain of around 2.6 per cent of 
household disposable income. However, this gain is not uniform across 
household types. Dual earner couples (with and without children) gain the most 
(around 4 per cent of disposable income) followed closely by employed lone 
parents (4 per cent); single earner couples with children (2.5 per cent) and 
without children (2.9 per cent); and single employed individuals without children 
(2.8 per cent). Altogether, around 65 per cent of all households would lose in 
excess of 2.5 per cent of their disposable income on average if tax relief on 
pension contributions was abolished.  
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TABLE 3  THE DIFFERENCE IN DISPOSABLE INCOME BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE IN THE ABSENCE OF 
TAX RELIEF ON PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS 
 Baseline 
Proportion of the 
population 
Dual Earner Couple with Children 4.3 9.1 
Dual Earner Couple without Children 4.1 5.0 
Employed Lone Parent 4.0 5.1 
Single Earner Couple without Children 2.9 5.6 
Single Employed without Children 2.8 32.5 
Dual Earner Couple with Relative Assisting 2.7 0.3 
Single Earner Couple with Children 2.5 8.3 
Retired Couple 0.4 8.5 
Single Retired Tax Unit 0.0 10.1 
All Other Tax Units 0.0 9.6 
Non-Earning Lone Parent 0.0 1.7 
Non-Earning Couple (>= 1 UE) with Kids 0.0 0.5 
Non-Earning Couple (>= 1 UE) no Kids 0.0 0.3 
Single Unemployed without Children -0.1 3.3 
All 2.6 100.0 
 
Source:  Baseline figures represent the 2017 situation compared to a situation with no tax relief on pension contributions. 
 
Reform 
We consider three potential reforms to the policy of tax relief on pension 
contributions. In System A, the cap on tax relief for pension contributions is 
halved from €115,000 to €57,500. In System B, tax relief is granted at the 
standard rate only, i.e. 20 per cent rather than the marginal tax rate of the 
individual. In System C, tax relief is granted at a hybrid standardised rate of 30 per 
cent. The cost of each of these systems is set out in Table 4. System A costs just 5 
per cent less than the baseline 2017 system. Systems B and C, which standardise 
the rate of relief at 20 per cent and 30 per cent respectively, result in higher 
savings. These amount to 46 per cent of the total cost of tax relief for System B 
and 19 per cent for System C.  
 
TABLE 4  ESTIMATES OF THE CHANGE IN THE COST OF TAX RELIEF ON PENSION 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
System 
A 
System 
B 
System 
C 
Change in tax relief on pension contributions (€ million) -114 -1,022 -420 
 -5% -46% -19% 
 
Source:  All costs are calculated relative to a system with no tax relief on pension contributions. System A halves the cap on tax relief 
from €115,000 to €57,500. System B and System C introduce standardisation of tax relief on pension contributions at 20 per 
cent and 30 per cent respectively. 
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FIGURE 2  THE DIFFERENCE IN HOUSEHOLD DISPOSABLE INCOME BY DECILE DUE TO 
ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS OF TAX RELIEF ON PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
 
  
 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations using SWITCH 2017 policies linked to pooled 2013-2014 SILC data 
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Figure 2 shows how disposable income by decile changes under the three 
alternative systems of tax relief on pension contributions. In System A, which 
decreases the cap on tax relief, there is little change to the distribution of tax 
relief on pension contributions. There are small losses for the top three deciles of 
disposable income but little change elsewhere in the income distribution. In 
System B, which standardises tax relief at 20 per cent, gains from tax relief on 
pension contributions are lower at all deciles (except Decile 1) but there is 
convergence in gains across the income distribution as richer households lose 
more than poorer households. The same logic applies to System C, which 
standardises tax relief at 30 per cent. In System C, households in the upper half of 
the income distribution lose compared to the baseline scenario but losses are not 
as large as with standardisation at 20 per cent (System B) because the rate at 
which the tax relief rate is standardised is higher. By standardising tax relief at 30 
per cent (System C), the gains of the top four deciles of the income distribution 
fall while the gains to the lower half of the income distribution are largely 
unchanged. 
 
Table 5 shows how the gains from tax relief on pension contributions by family 
type change in the three reform scenarios. Changes in these gains are modest in 
System A with most household types losing between 1 per cent and 7 per cent of 
disposable income compared to the baseline. System B and System C result in 
larger losses in comparison to the baseline. In System B, the households who 
benefit from tax relief on pension contributions lose just under half of this benefit 
compared to the baseline. In System C, most households who benefit from tax 
relief lose between 15-20 per cent of the benefit. There are no household types 
which stand out as losing relatively more or less than others in these reform 
systems.  
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TABLE 5  THE CHANGE IN DISPOSABLE INCOME BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE RESULTING FROM 
ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS OF TAX RELIEF ON PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
System A 
% 
System B 
% 
System C 
% 
Proportion 
of the 
population 
Dual Earner Couple with Children -5 -47 -20 9.1 
Dual Earner Couple without Children -7 -47 -20 5.0 
Employed Lone Parent -4 -45 -17 5.1 
Single Earner Couple without Children -5 -42 -14 5.6 
Single Employed without Children -4 -47 -21 32.5 
Dual Earner Couple with Relative Assisting -2 -43 -16 0.3 
Single Earner Couple with Children -7 -43 -15 8.3 
Retired Couple -1 -40 -11 8.5 
Single Retired Tax Unit 0 -27 9 10.1 
All Other Tax Units 0 0 50 9.6 
Non-Earning Lone Parent 0 0 0 1.7 
Non-Earning Couple (>= 1 UE) with Kids 0 0 0 0.5 
Non-Earning Couple (>= 1 UE) no Kids 0 0 0 0.3 
Single Unemployed without Children 0 -100 -100 3.3 
All -5 -46 -19 100.0 
 
Source:  All figures show differences in disposable income compared to the 2017 system of tax relief on pension contributions. 
 
Behavioural effects 
So far, our analysis has refrained from discussing behavioural changes to any 
reform of the tax treatment of pensions. However, individuals may well react to a 
reform by increasing or decreasing the level of their contribution, thus changing 
the overall cost or saving from the reform. The literature indicates that these 
effects are likely to be small. Policy reforms which require individuals to actively 
change their contributions in order to benefit are likely to have a low response 
rate and, of those who respond, these are more likely to shift money destined for 
pension contributions to another savings account (which may also be used as a 
form of retirement income) rather than stop saving for retirement altogether 
(Attanasio et al., 2004; Chetty et al., 2014). As such, tax incentives for pension 
contributions face a substantial ‘deadweight’ problem, of subsidising savings that 
would have taken place anyway. This is particularly true for higher earners. As the 
reforms discussed in this report mainly affect the amount of tax deductible by 
higher earners, we might expect small behavioural responses from this group, 
who can be expected to decrease their pension contributions in response to the 
reform (thus increasing the total State savings from the reform). However, this 
decrease in pension contributions is likely to be at least partly offset by an 
increase in other types of saving. 
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CONCLUSION 
This report has re-examined the cost of tax relief on pension contributions 
compared to a benchmark scenario in which pension contributions are taxed 
both on the way in and on the way out of pension funds, as is done in Revenue 
costings. This analysis shows that the SWITCH model, using pooled data from the 
CSO’s Survey on Income and Living Conditions for 2013 and 2014, broadly 
replicates the scale of pension tax relief identified by Revenue – around €1.3 
billion annually – and confirms that most of the gains from tax relief on 
contributions are concentrated in the upper half of the income distribution. Dual 
earner couples gain the most, followed by employed lone parents, single earner 
couples and single employed individuals without children. 
 
Taking into account the government’s financial support of public sector pensions 
– which constitutes a ‘benefit-in-kind’ to public sector employees - increases the 
estimated cost of tax relief on pension contributions by almost €0.8 billion 
annually. The cost of tax relief on public sector pensions, given the addition of 
these implicit employer contributions by the government, accounts for more than 
half of the total cost of tax relief on pension contributions.  
 
Given the wide variation across countries in the tax treatment of pensions (see, 
for example, Whitehouse, 1999), there is no single tax treatment which can be 
identified as commanding universal acceptance as a standard. Our analysis 
focuses on the first-round implications (before any responses in savings or labour 
supply behaviour) to some widely discussed potential changes in the tax 
treatment of pensions (Department of Social and Family Affairs, 2007).  
 
Using SWITCH, we simulate a number of reforms to the current tax treatment of 
pensions including a halving of the cap on tax relief and a switch to a 
standardised rate of relief of 20 per cent or 30 per cent. These scenarios result in 
savings of between 5 and 46 per cent of the total cost of tax relief on pension 
contributions before behavioural responses. In all scenarios, richer households 
lose the most from any reform but losses are minimal in the case of altering the 
cap on tax relief. In the case of standardisation of tax relief, richer households 
lose much more than poorer ones leading to a convergence in the distribution of 
gains from tax relief.  
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS FOR A GLOBAL ECONOMY: THE CASE OF 
IRELAND1 
John FitzGerald*  
ABSTRACT 
Globalisation is affecting the way economic activity is reflected in the National 
Accounts. Intellectual property, which is now part of the capital stock, interacts 
with the choice of global firms as to their legal structure, producing different 
national accounting outcomes for individual countries. This is but one 
manifestation of the challenges that a global economy presents for national 
accounting. Using the example of Ireland, consideration is given to the data 
needed to meet the needs of users of National Accounts. In particular, more 
information is required to separately identify all the activity of multinational 
enterprises and domestically owned firms. This paper suggests a set of satellite 
accounts for Ireland that would show how changes in the economy affect the 
economic welfare of Irish residents. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper considers some of the problems for users of the current system of 
National Accounts due to the globalisation process. The inclusion of intellectual 
capital in the capital stock in the latest System of National Accounts (SNA 2008) 
further complicates a situation that was already difficult. While this note 
concentrates on the problems using data for Ireland, many of the same problems 
affect users of National Accounts for other economies, albeit to a lesser extent 
(Avdjiev et al., 2018; Wright and Zucman, 2018). 
 
The National Accounts were originally developed for a pre-Second World War 
economy where goods and services were produced within individual countries 
without substantial inputs from abroad. The modern world, where goods and 
services for final demand are produced in stages across a range of countries 
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March 2018 for helpful comments and suggestions. All the data used in this paper are from published sources. 
* John FitzGerald is Research Affiliate at the ESRI and Adjunct Professor at Trinity College Dublin. jofitzge@tcd.ie. 
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involving a complicated supply chain, poses special problems for National 
Accounts. 
 
The growth in the importance of intellectual property (IP) as a key input in the 
production of some goods and services has further complicated things. These 
problems are aggravated by the operation of US tax law. 
 
The importance of foreign Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) in the Irish economy, 
especially US owned MNEs, and their concentration in certain key sectors where 
IP is crucial, means that the Irish National Accounts face special problems of 
interpretation.  
 
In the case of Ireland, the problems with the National Accounts have manifested 
themselves in a particularly remarkable way, giving rise to a growth in real GDP in 
2015 of over 25 per cent that was clearly ‘incredible’. The fact that it was 
incredible reflects a problem with the underlying accounting framework, not with 
a failure to apply the accounting standards. 
 
National Accounts were developed to meet a range of needs of policymakers in 
managing a modern economy. For example, national accounting data are 
required by those responsible for fiscal policy to understand what is happening 
on the domestic labour market and also the level of utilisation of physical capital 
located in Ireland. They also need to know how much of the output in Ireland 
represents a benefit to Irish residents.  
 
While many countries have standardised on SNA 2008 (ESA 2010), the failure to 
implement it globally gives rise to a mismeasurement of global GDP: the 
movement of major economic activity to Ireland in 2015, as measured by SNA 
2008, does not appear to have been counterbalanced by a corresponding fall 
elsewhere. This lack of consistency poses problems for international comparisons 
outside the EU. 
 
There are also special problems in interpreting the current account of the Balance 
of Payments as a result of the unfolding of the globalisation process. The current 
account of the Balance of Payments is a key indicator of the sustainability of the 
current level of economic activity in an economy, but the standard treatment 
under SNA 2008 renders it totally ineffective as an indicator for a country such as 
Ireland. 
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In seeking to find a solution to the Irish problems the best approach would be to 
modify the ESA/SNA to ensure that it provided appropriate data for policymakers 
in all jurisdictions. However, this is clearly not going to happen in the foreseeable 
future. Instead Ireland and other countries affected in a similar manner will have 
to persevere in producing an appropriate framework of satellite accounts that 
provides a sensible depiction of what is happening in the domestic economy. 
While most external users will continue to use GDP for international 
comparisons, an alternative domestic framework providing more appropriate 
indicators of domestic economic activity, could, if suitably explained, be used by 
those interested in economic policy in Ireland, and also by those abroad 
interested in the Irish economy. However, it would be beneficial if a similar 
supplementary framework of accounts was adopted by other countries, 
particularly those affected by the problems discussed in this paper. 
 
Where problems will arise will be with EU aggregates, such as Euro Area GDP, 
which is affected by the discontinuities in the accounts for Ireland. In 2015 the 
exceptional growth in Irish GDP added 0.5 percentage points to the Euro Area 
growth rate. International agencies such as the ECB, DG Ecfin, the IMF, etc., will 
need to adjust for such discontinuities.  
 
Section 2 of this paper discusses the needs of users of National Accounts. The 
failure of the current system of accounts to meet these needs underpins the 
discussion in the rest of the paper. 
 
Section 3 considers how we model output in a global world. The complexity of 
modern supply chains poses special problems in developing National Accounts for 
very open economies. The evolving model of world production requires a 
development in the way the National Accounts measures an economy. In 
particular, a new set of satellite accounts needs to handle the returns on IP 
capital, which can be located anywhere in the world, in an appropriate manner. It 
also needs to focus on the utilisation of labour and physical capital located in a 
country. 
 
Section 4 describes the National Accounting significance of the legal structures 
used by MNEs in operating in different economies. Any new system of satellite 
accounts needs to be robust to changes in the legal structure of large companies 
or changes in tax law. 
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Section 5 sets out the problems posed for the Irish National Accounts as a result 
of globalisation and Section 6 outlines some possible solutions to the problems 
identified in this paper. Conclusions are reached in Section 7. 
 
2. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF COLLECTING NATIONAL ACCOUNTS? 
The National Accounts are designed to present a picture of an economy that can 
be useful to those managing that economy or working in that economy. The way 
the accounts are defined and presented should take account of the needs of 
users and the purpose for which they will be used.  
 
Fiscal and monetary policy 
Since the national accounting framework was first developed, the National 
Accounts, in particular the key aggregates, have been an essential tool for those 
responsible for fiscal and monetary policy. In the case of fiscal and monetary 
policy it is very important to understand the state of the economic cycle using 
national accounting data. 
 
In addition, in preparing a Budget, governments need to understand, not just the 
overall level of output, but also what is happening on a range of other important 
national accounting aggregates. This is essential in assessing tax revenue for the 
coming year, and also in understanding the pressures on expenditure.  
 
Both for fiscal and monetary policy it is, therefore, necessary to have at least one 
or two key aggregates that represent the level of real activity in the domestic 
economy – the economy for which the policymakers are responsible.  
 
Fiscal rules, such as the Stability and Growth Pact and its successor depend on 
GDP being a meaningful indicator of domestic activity. For countries such as 
Ireland, an alternative set of measures is needed on which to base fiscal rules. 
 
In managing monetary policy the behaviour of Central Banks is often 
characterised using a Taylor rule. Under such a rule monetary policy is tightened 
as actual output rises above potential output. However, such a rule depends on 
the availability of reliable measures of domestic output. 
 
To support policymakers, national accounting aggregates must be consistent over 
time. Discontinuities, for whatever reason, make it impossible to determine the 
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  S umm er  20 18  |  8 9  
 
growth rate at the point of discontinuity. In addition, to understand the 
behaviour of the economy and to calibrate policy interventions correctly it is 
essential to have consistent time series for the National Accounts that can be 
used for research and related modelling. 
 
A second requirement for the National Accounts aggregates is that they reflect 
the level of physical activity in the economy being regulated by the fiscal or 
monetary policy authorities. The data must show developments in the domestic 
labour market and the domestic market for physical capital. The data could well 
prove misleading if they cover physical activity that takes place in other 
economies. SNA 2008/ESA 2010 does not ensure that the output covered by the 
key aggregates, such as GDP, is appropriately aligned with the jurisdiction of 
individual fiscal or monetary policy authorities. 
 
The proposed approach would mean that the real activity of subsidiaries of 
domestic multinationals should be included in the output of the economies 
where the subsidiaries employ labour and physical capital. In turn, domestic 
activity for Ireland should include the real activity of subsidiaries of foreign 
owned multinationals that takes place in Ireland.  
 
Broader economic policies 
A second major role for the National Accounts is to provide appropriate 
information to governments on how an economy is behaving, where growth is 
coming from, where output is being sold etc. This information is needed to 
support governments in developing policy across a wide range of different fields. 
 
Policymakers are primarily concerned with output and activity physically located 
in the country over which they have jurisdiction. For example, if a significant part 
of the output attributed to Ireland is produced in Asia with Asian labour and 
Asian physical capital, this will be of little concern to domestic policymakers. It is 
only in so far as the activities of such businesses directly affect those who are 
living in the country for which the accounts are prepared, that the accounts will 
be useful. 
 
As discussed later, the accounts for Ireland, prepared under SNA 2008/ESA 2010, 
do not meet either of these two requirements. In Ireland the problem arises in 
trying to identify what part of the activity being measured in the accounts directly 
benefits those living in Ireland. 
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The current account of the Balance of Payments was one of the key indicators 
showing that the growth in activity in Ireland (and a number of other EU 
economies) was unsustainable in the last decade. However, because of the 
effects of globalisation on the accounts today, the current account of the Balance 
of Payments no longer signals the gap between savings and investment of Irish 
agents. It is clear that such an indicator is essential for the safe management of a 
modern economy. 
 
Informing citizens and companies in the economy about what is 
happening 
The considerations here are very similar to those for policymakers. Citizens and 
companies need information on what is happening in an economy in so far as it 
will affect them. In an economy with large foreign MNE activity this means that 
the attention should be more focussed on GNI and Net National Income (NNI) 
rather than on GDP. 
 
For this broader audience it is even more important that the development of the 
economy, as manifested in the accounts, is clearly explained. There will also be a 
need to concentrate on one or two key aggregates when communicating with a 
very wide audience. 
 
Tax base 
The National Accounts data, in particular GNI, are used as a tax base in calculating 
Budgetary Contributions to the EU. For this purpose they should include activity 
that benefits those living in a country, even if much of the related activity does 
not take place in that country. Because Ireland benefits from the corporation tax 
paid by foreign MNEs operating in Ireland, it is appropriate that their profits, on 
which Irish corporation tax is paid, should be included in the base for EU taxation. 
 
International comparability 
A further very important use of National Accounts data is to provide international 
comparisons between economies. For this purpose it is essential that the data are 
prepared on the same accounting basis across countries. Currently all EU 
countries use SNA 2008/ESA 2010, which facilitates comparisons within the EU. 
However, because countries are affected in different ways by the process of 
globalisation, if there are anomalies in how the accounting standards treat 
certain items, it may affect the usefulness of the data for comparative purposes. 
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Where the inadequacies of SNA 2008 require the development of satellite 
accounts, as discussed in this paper, it would be better that they were done on a 
consistent basis across countries. If each country develops its own system of 
satellite accounts, policymaking at an EU level would be less transparent. To the 
extent that SNA 2008 is not fully implemented in some non-EU countries this 
makes international comparisons with non-EU countries more difficult. 
 
3. MODELLING OUTPUT 
When National Accounts were first developed in the 1930s it was not 
unreasonable to consider the world as being made up of a series of national 
economies which undertook limited trade in final goods. However, since the 
Second World War, major changes in the world economy, especially the freeing 
of trade, have changed this situation so that for some purposes national 
economies, in the sense of the 1930s, have been transformed into subsectors of a 
global economy.  
 
It can be useful to consider these and other changes within an encompassing 
model of world production. In this model the choice of the location for 
production by a stylised world firm (or myriad of firms) is made so as to minimise 
the world firm’s cost of production. In the 1930s each firm chose capital, labour 
and materials in each separate national economy to minimise the cost of 
production of national output. Domestic production was primarily directed at 
satisfying domestic demand.  
 
However, with the freeing of trade, the world firm(s) can choose to locate some 
of the production process of a good (or service) in one country and then combine 
the components produced in one country with labour and capital in another 
location to produce a final good. In this case the production of the final good in a 
country will be undertaken using domestic capital and labour, combined with 
materials for further production that are produced in another location. Where 
final products consist of components from many countries, the cost of production 
in an individual country can influence domestic value added (GDP) in two ways: 
• First the relative cost of production in one country compared to the rest of 
the world will affect the location where the final good will be produced, 
hence affecting domestic value added (GDP).  
• Secondly, changes in relative factor prices within a country can also affect 
domestic value added by causing the world firm to produce more or less of 
that final good in the relevant country by varying the share of material inputs, 
many of which may be imported – the substitution effect of changes in 
relative prices.  
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This model encompasses behaviour such as outsourcing, modelling it as a 
function of the changes in the cost of domestic inputs relative to the cost of 
materials produced abroad. As a result, as discussed below, the effect of changes 
in the relative cost of domestic inputs on domestic value added must include 
both the substitution of gross output in a particular economy for similar output 
elsewhere, and also the substitution of domestic inputs (labour and capital) by 
material inputs, which are generally imported. 
),,( tccfC RIw =        (1) 
The approach taken in the traditional National Accounts of the 1930s assumed a 
model where the production of goods on a worldwide scale can be characterised 
by a cost function (1) where the cost of world output, Cw, is a function of the unit 
cost of production in an individual country cI relative to the rest of the world, cR, 
and technical progress, t.2 Then the share of world output QW that is located in 
the individual country i, QI, (2) is a function of the unit cost of production in 
country i, cI, relative to the unit cost of production in the rest of the world, cR, 
and technical progress, t.  
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       (2) 
𝑐𝑖 = 𝐶𝑖𝑄𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑝𝑙 ,𝑝𝑘 ,𝑝𝑚, 𝑡)      (3) 
 
The unit cost of production in country i is defined in Equation (3) as a function of 
the price of labour, pl, the cost of capital, pk, the price of inputs of goods and 
services, pm, and technical progress, t. From this equation the share of each of 
the factors of production – labour, capital and materials – in domestic output can 
be determined.  
 
For this model to be a valid representation of the economy of country i, a number 
of assumptions are necessary, including the assumption of constant returns to 
scale.  
 
For a national output aggregate to be valid for any country it must be weakly 
homothetically separable from output in all other countries (Denny and Fuss, 
1977; Pindyck, 1979). This allows a two-stage optimisation procedure where firms 
in individual countries choose the optimal mix of inputs to use to produce 
 
                                                          
 
2  The exposition here is based on Bradley and FitzGerald, 1988. 
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national output. Then the share of world output to be produced in country i is a 
function of the unit cost of production in country i relative to the unit cost of 
production in all other countries. 
 
The assumption of weak homothetic separability means that changes in relative 
prices of factors of production within one country, which do not affect the overall 
cost of production in that country, will not affect the mix of inputs used to 
produce a good in another country. In other words, in producing a good or 
service it is not possible to freely mix factor inputs from different countries in 
different proportions to produce a final good or service. This is a world where the 
supply chain does not spread across different countries but inputs are sourced 
nationally. While this restriction may have seemed realistic in the 1930s, in a 
modern world the restrictions are no longer valid.  
 
The freeing of trade in the post-war world saw trade expanding rapidly, not just 
in final goods and services, but also in inputs used in the production process. This 
has gradually resulted in the complex supply chains which underpin modern 
production. This development gives rise to many of the problems with the 
National Accounts for countries such as Ireland, which are small but fully 
integrated into the global supply chain. 
 
Because of the ability to shift production between countries, the effects of 
reaching full employment or full utilisation of fixed capital in a particular 
economy can be rather different from that in a closed economy world. Instead of 
factor prices rising rapidly in the face of high levels of capacity utilisation, it is 
possible to shift some of the production process elsewhere. This has implications 
for fiscal and monetary policy. 
 
A second assumption of the standard production model is that capital is located 
in a particular country and used for production in that country. It also assumes 
that the marginal product of capital (and of other factors) is diminishing. 
However, intellectual property, which is now, appropriately, included as an 
element of the capital stock, has rather different characteristics. It may be 
technically located in one country (and receive its returns in that country), while 
it may be used to produce output world-wide. As Haskel and Westlake, 2017, 
emphasise, intellectual property (IP) is highly scalable: the same ‘quantity’ of IP 
can be used to produce a million or a billion smartphones. As a result, this type of 
capital does not fit easily into the traditional model of production or into the 
traditional National Accounts framework; the marginal product of IP is not 
diminishing. Also it can be used across many different countries. 
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𝐶 = 𝑓(𝐾𝑝,𝑝𝑖𝑙 ,𝑝𝑖𝑘 ,𝑝𝑗𝑙𝑝𝑗𝑘 …… 𝑝𝑟, 𝑡)     (4) 
 
Today the choice facing the world firm(s) may be better represented by 
Equation 4 which relaxes the assumption of weak homothetic separability 
between factors in individual countries. Instead the world firm(s) can choose to 
mix the factors from different countries i, j, etc. in a complicated supply chain. 
Raw materials pr are located independently of where the production takes place. 
Also, in the modern world the stock of IP, Kp is increasingly separable from all 
other factors of production. It can be located anywhere in the world.  
 
The returns on IP are separable from the returns to the other factors. This means 
that the inclusion of the returns to IP in a particular economy may not reflect the 
returns to that factor as used in that economy. National output, as understood 
when the National Accounts were first developed, no longer exists as a separable 
aggregate. The attribution to Ireland of the returns to IP owned by foreign MNEs 
in Ireland is very seriously distorting the traditional measure of national output. 
That is because the returns to IP arise from the use of the IP to produce goods in 
Asia, not Ireland. 
 
However, while such a model better represents a global world, it has been 
necessary to impose significant restrictions to make it tractable for economic 
analysis. Nonetheless it is important that the data provided by the National 
Accounts reflect the complex decision-making process which determines the 
global location of output and the utilisation of factors in individual countries. 
 
The theoretical model has important implications for the users of National 
Accounts and for the information they need to obtain from the accounts. 
 
Instead of concentrating on national output (GDP) which includes the returns to 
IP capital, fiscal and monetary authorities need to focus on the utilisation of 
‘domestic’ factors of production, physical capital3 and labour, located in an 
individual economy. Focusing on the utilisation of domestic factors of production 
also deals with the problem that in a modern economy, with complicated supply 
chains, domestic factors of production are not weakly separable from factors of 
production in other countries. 
 
                                                          
 
3  This includes the physical capital owned by foreign MNEs that is located in a particular economy. 
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This suggests that a lot more information is required on the income and output 
side of the accounts to understand what is happening to the utilisation of 
‘domestic’ factors of production and where growth in an economy is actually 
arising. The returns to labour and physical capital, wages, and profits before and 
after depreciation, need to be separately identified for each sector. Separately 
identifying the returns to IP capital will not be feasible. Instead, companies where 
the returns to IP capital dominate profits from using physical capital (foreign 
MNEs in the Irish context) will need to be separately identified. Finally, because 
policymakers are also interested in the income available to domestic residents, 
the contribution of firms to Net National Income (NNI) needs to be identified by 
sector. 
 
4. LEGAL DISTINCTIONS MATTER 
Two legal issues have a significant effect on how the operations of MNEs are 
reflected in National Accounts. The first concerns the legal form used by an MNE 
operating in a country other than its home location. The second is how the 
company is affected by tax law, in particular how US companies are affected by 
US tax law. 
 
Legal structure 
For over a century many companies have moved from operating on a purely 
national scale to operating in two or more different countries. This ‘globalisation’ 
can occur in different ways. Initially a company may buy services or inputs from 
firms in other countries. A second stage may involve the establishment of a 
subsidiary in one or more foreign countries making the company a Multinational 
Enterprise (MNE). A third approach, which has become more popular in recent 
decades, is to contract with foreign firms to manufacture goods on behalf of the 
MNE in factories owned by independent companies in foreign locations. 
 
Where firms buy goods or services abroad this appears in the National Accounts 
as imports and exports in a straightforward manner. The output in the foreign 
location is included in that country’s GDP. 
 
Before the freeing of trade the establishment of a foreign subsidiary was often 
the only way to move into a new market, bypassing tariff barriers. It allowed 
companies to exploit their intellectual property on a wider scale in the face of 
major restrictions on trade. 
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Today, for many MNEs, this approach remains a vital stage in establishing an 
integrated supply chain. Whereas initially the production process may have been 
replicated in different locations to avoid tariffs, today the different stages in the 
supply chain may be undertaken by subsidiaries located in different countries 
around the world to minimise the world cost of production.  
 
In setting up a subsidiary in a country, an MNE establishes a legal presence there. 
The physical capital and labour used by the subsidiary is clearly part of the stock 
of physical capital and labour in the country where the subsidiary is located. As a 
result, the activity of the subsidiary is recorded as part of the activity in the 
country where it is located: the GVA, physical investment, employment, the wage 
bill, profits and depreciation are all included in the detailed National Accounts for 
the country where the subsidiary resides.  
 
The relationship of a subsidiary in another country with the parent MNE, 
wherever it is located, is reflected in a transfer of the after-tax profits earned by 
the subsidiary to the parent, a flow of factor income which represents a wedge 
between GDP and GNI. Even if temporarily retained in the origin country, this 
payment is treated as being accrued to the MNE parent in the period in which it is 
earned. There may also be other intra-company transfers which affect the 
National Accounts. For example, royalties may be paid for use of the parent 
company’s IP. Also parts or services may pass from one subsidiary to another, 
appearing as exports and imports. 
 
A third approach to operating on a global scale involves an MNE contracting with 
a company in another country to have goods or services produced for it. In this 
case the MNE provides the IP but the local company owns the capital and 
employs local labour. Because the work is done on contract for the MNE, the 
goods or services produced by the local company are owned by the MNE from 
the initiation of the production process.4 The goods (or services) are recorded as 
an export from the country where the MNE that owns the goods resides, not 
from the country where they were manufactured. Also imported inputs used in 
the process are recorded as imports in the country where the MNE that owns the 
goods resides. The operating surplus, over and above the payments to the local 
 
                                                          
 
4  For example, while small relative to the total output of the Irish pharmaceutical sector, there has been contract 
manufacturing work done in Ireland for foreign pharmaceutical companies. In this case the drug is shipped in powder 
form to an Irish company to be pressed into tablet form. The powdered drug is, at all times, owned by the foreign 
company contracting with the Irish company so that it is not considered as being produced in Ireland. Rather, for 
national accounting purposes, only the payment to the Irish company for the services is included in exports. 
Meanwhile, the gross flows of the drug are included in the trade statistics. 
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producer, is recorded as output in the country where the MNE that owns the IP is 
located.5 
 
Thus there is a very different national accounting treatment for goods or services 
physically produced in a country depending on the legal arrangements between 
the MNE and the local company. 
 
The decision by MNEs to go the contract manufacturing route may be due to 
uncertainty about how well a subsidiary company may be treated in the host 
country’s legal system or by its administration.6 Local entrepreneurs may be 
favoured in many ways. Also the MNE may be concerned that, if IP is transferred 
to a subsidiary, it might not be protected by the host country legal system. 
 
For whatever reason, contract manufacturing tends to be used by IT companies 
with large IP having goods manufactured in countries such as China. The 
subsidiary route is favoured in cross border activities by MNEs, such as German or 
Japanese MNEs producing cars and other goods, in particular where the 
subsidiaries are located in OECD countries. 
 
The fact that the distinction between manufacture by a subsidiary and 
manufacture on contract makes a big difference to the national accounting 
treatment of MNE activity leaves open the possibility of future big discontinuities 
in the National Accounts for individual countries. If the legal framework changed 
to make establishing a subsidiary preferable in certain major Asian economies, 
such as China, the MNEs currently operating contract arrangements could 
suddenly change their legal form. This could result in a large amount of what is 
treated as output in Ireland, or elsewhere, suddenly being included in the 
National Accounts for the Asian country where the physical manufacturing takes 
place. The relocation of output in the accounts would be replaced by a transfer to 
the MNE, wherever it is headquartered, of after-tax profits as part of factor 
income. Similarly, a shift of production from China to a country, such as India, 
where establishment of subsidiaries is preferred, could also see a major change in 
output in the country where the MNE’s head office is located, such as Ireland. 
While these cases would give rise to significant discontinuities in GDP, they 
should not affect NNI (Net National Income).7  
 
                                                          
 
5  Thus the operating surplus on manufacturing “Donald Trump” ties in China in 2015 would have been treated as US 
GDP, in spite of the fact that they were manufactured in China on contract. 
6  For example, foreigners may be subject to arbitrary charges. 
7  As discussed later, the treatment of depreciation of IP of MNEs can seriously distort GNI. 
98 |  Q uar t er ly  Eco nomi c  C omme nt ary  –  S um me r 2 01 8  
 
 
While the current approach to recording activity in SNA 2008, if applied across 
the world, will consistently record world GDP, it poses many problems for the key 
users of the data. It means that GDP and also, as is outlined later, GNI may not 
provide a good guide for policymakers. In addition, if the SNA is not correctly 
applied in all countries by their national accounting authorities, world GDP and 
GNI may be incorrect and subject to discontinuities as MNEs change their legal 
structure. 
 
As was discussed in the previous section, what is needed is a set of satellite 
accounts identifying the returns to domestic factors of production, distinguishing 
between foreign MNEs and the rest of the economy. Unlike the current situation 
with GDP and GNI, NNI arising by sector, derived in this way, will be unaffected by 
changes in MNEs’ legal structures in third country locations. 
 
Tax law 
A number of the problems with the Irish National Accounts arise from how US tax 
law affects the behaviour of US MNEs. The problems are much less in dealing 
with MNEs originating in other countries such as Germany, France, or the UK. The 
key difference is that, until now, US tax law meant that all profits of US firms, 
wherever earned, were taxable eventually in the US. However, until now, US 
firms were allowed to defer repatriating profits and so ‘temporarily’ avoid paying 
the US tax liability. This has proved especially important for firms with large IP, 
such as firms in the IT sector.  
 
The changes in US tax law in 2017 are significant and may lead to further 
movement, especially changes in the country in which firms locate their IP. The 
requirement that the US owners of IP held abroad pay a minimum tax rate of 10 
per cent could see further major relocation of such IP, possibly to Ireland. 
However, we do not consider how the recent US changes in tax law may affect 
the National Accounts in the future in any detail. 
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TABLE 1 SHARE OF GROSS OPERATING SURPLUS IN GVA, BY COUNTRY OF OWNERSHIP, % 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Germany 34.4 31.8 41.6 40.5 53.4 NA 59.2 36.3 
France 53.3 42.0 56.0 71.5 47.1 NA 60.3 58.7 
UK 38.1 34.1 32.9 46.6 43.4 NA 49.3 38.2 
US 79.8 80.1 81.1 82.6 82.8 NA 85.6 94.4 
Japan 62.8 69.3 62.6 74.5 70.9 NA 82.7 84.0 
Other foreign 58.3 54.9 62.2 63.3 66.6 NA 54.5 80.2 
Ireland 28.1 31.2 32.6 35.4 35.4 NA 37.9 44.7 
 
Source:  Eurostat Structural Business Statistics.  
 
Since 1956, Ireland has operated a low rate of corporation tax which was 
gradually extended to cover all activity undertaken in Ireland.8 This has made it 
attractive for some MNEs to adjust their global structure so that a larger share of 
their global profits is earned in Ireland and subject to Irish corporation tax 
(Conroy, et al., 1998). Such a transfer of profits is reflected in the gross operating 
surplus of firms so that it represents a high share of their value added in Ireland. 
 
Table 1 shows the Gross Operating Surplus (GOS) of subsidiaries of foreign MNEs 
operating in Ireland as a share of Gross Value Added (GVA), and a comparable 
figure for Irish firms. The shares for German, UK and Irish firms are rather similar. 
The share for French subsidiaries in Ireland is a bit higher. However, the profit 
share for US firms is exceptionally high, and also very high for other non-EU firms, 
including Japanese firms. After the relocation to Ireland of IP by US owned MNEs 
in 2015, the profit share for such firms approached 95 per cent of value added. 
 
These data suggest that for MNEs owned in the EU, domestic tax law in the 
country where the MNEs are resident makes shifting of profits to an offshore 
location, such as Ireland, difficult. Alternatively the nature of their business may 
also make the separation of the returns to IP (which can be relocated) from other 
profits difficult. 
 
After the relocation to Ireland of IP in 2015 by one or more US firms, two-thirds 
of the gross operating surplus arising in Ireland was attributable to US firms and 
under 10 per cent to firms from other foreign countries. By contrast, only 6 per 
cent of employment in Ireland was in US owned companies.  
 
                                                          
 
8  In 1956 the law was changed to exempt profits earned from exporting from corporation tax. In 1980 this exemption 
was replaced by a 10 per cent rate of tax on all manufacturing firms. In the 1990s a 12.5 per cent rate was gradually 
applied to all sectors of the economy, being fully implemented by 2003. 
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The obvious conclusion from Table 1 is that US tax law has resulted in US 
companies transferring substantial profits to Ireland whereas, in the case of 
MNEs from other counties that account for the bulk of employment by MNEs in 
Ireland, they have not transferred much of their global profits to Ireland because 
of the nature of their business or because of the way the tax law is implemented 
in the country where the MNEs are headquartered. 
 
The importance of tax law in determining the shifting of profits on US MNEs’ IP 
highlights the need to separately identify foreign MNEs’ activities in the output 
and income tables of the National Accounts. 
 
5. IRISH NATIONAL ACCOUNTING ISSUES 
Ireland joined the EU in 1973 and, since that date, the economy has become 
increasingly globalised. There have been a series of important developments as a 
result of globalisation which have affected the economy and its portrayal in the 
National Accounts over the subsequent 45 years.  
 
The first development was the important role played by the low rate of 
corporation tax in attracting foreign MNEs to establish subsidiaries in Ireland. In 
turn they tended to be highly profitable, with some firms – especially from the US 
– transferring profits to Ireland.  
 
The direct benefit for people living in Ireland from the activity of foreign owned 
MNEs is the wage bill and the corporation tax paid in Ireland (the contribution to 
NNI). The profits, after tax, flow back to the foreign owners of MNE subsidiaries in 
Ireland. Thus GDP, which includes the profits of the MNEs, is not as good a 
measure of the economic welfare of those living in Ireland as GNI, which excludes 
the after-tax profits. 
 
By the end of the 1970s there was very substantial manufacturing activity 
undertaken in Ireland by foreign owned MNEs. The attraction of Ireland for MNEs 
derived from their ready access to the wider EU market, the fact that labour costs 
were significantly lower than elsewhere in the EU, a stable business environment 
and a low corporate tax rate.9 As a result of the low corporate tax rate there was 
a significant incentive for MNEs to move profits to Ireland through transfer 
pricing (Conroy et al., 1998). As a result, the profits earned by MNEs have 
 
                                                          
 
9  Up to 1980 a zero rate of corporate tax applied to profits deriving from exports. 
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  S umm er  20 18  |  1 01  
 
represented an increasing share of GDP over time, driving a growing wedge 
between GDP and GNI.  
 
As shown in Figure 1, whereas in the early 1970s GNI was higher than GDP, by 
1980 GNI was 5 per cent less than GDP as a result of the outflow of profits of 
MNEs. This gap between the two has widened over time and, since 2009, GNI has 
generally been less than 85 per cent of GDP.  
 
In the 1970s the profits recorded as flowing out of the country were actual 
remittances, but there was a growing build-up of accrued profits, especially 
among US MNEs. This was not recognised in the National Accounts until 1984, 
when the profit outflows were shown on an accruals basis for the first time 
(Honohan, 1984). This resulted in a substantial upward revision in the deficit on 
the current account of the Balance of Payments, with serious implications for 
economic policy. (The deficit on the current account of the Balance of Payments 
was revised upwards from 12.5 per cent of GDP to over 15 per cent for 1981). 
 
FIGURE 1 RATIO OF GNI TO GNP, CURRENT PRICES 
 
 
Source:  CSO National Income and Expenditure, 2016 and CSO Historical National Accounts. 
 
More recently the National Accounts for Ireland have been significantly affected 
by a range of other factors arising from globalisation: the growth in activity by 
redomiciled PLCs; changes in patents of pharmaceutical companies; the growth of 
a large aircraft leasing sector; and, finally, the inclusion of IP in investment, 
interacting with changes in ownership of this IP (de Haan and Haynes, 2018).  
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National accounting rules have significantly affected how these developments 
have been represented in the National Accounts: in some cases their treatment in 
the accounts means that GNI, rather than GDP, is a reasonable measure of the 
income and welfare of those living in Ireland. However, the growth of redomiciled 
PLCs, and of the ownership of IP by MNEs located in Ireland has, in more recent 
years, also seriously affected the usefulness of GNI for the purposes for which 
National Accounts are used by policymakers. 
 
A number of the problems with the Irish National Accounts have been discussed 
in earlier papers:  
• Over the last few years a number of companies (referred to as redomiciled 
plcs) have relocated their headquarters to Ireland without generating any 
real activity in the economy in terms of employment or purchases of 
domestic inputs. The retained income of these companies adds to GNI while 
the income is actually attributable to the foreign owners of the companies. 
This means that GNI is no longer an appropriate measure of the income 
available to Irish residents. FitzGerald (2013b) and Avdjiev et al. (2018) 
discuss this issue in detail and the latest data for the net income of these 
firms are shown in Table 2. 
 
TABLE 2 NET INCOME OF REDOMICILED PLCS AS % OF GNI 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
0.2 1.1 3.7 4.0 5.0 4.2 4.1 2.3 2.5 
 
Source:  www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/in/rpibp/redomiciledplcsintheirishbalanceofpayments. 
 
• The pharmaceutical sector has grown in importance in the economy since the 
1990s with the vast bulk of the output coming from foreign owned MNEs. By 
2010 the sector accounted for almost 10 per cent of GDP. These firms are 
generally highly profitable, reflecting the huge IP involved in developing their 
products. This IP is protected by patents which have a limited life. When 
important drugs fall out of patent it can distort the figures for GDP. This 
problem was discussed in detail in FitzGerald, 2013a. 
• Over the last 15 years aircraft leasing has expanded dramatically in Ireland, 
with most of the major MNEs engaging in this business having subsidiaries in 
Ireland. The national accounting treatment of this activity has been discussed 
in detail in FitzGerald, 2015. The CSO has recently published fairly 
comprehensive data on the sector, as shown in Table 3. 
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TABLE 3 AIRCRAFT LEASING SHARE OF KEY NATIONAL ACCOUNTS AGGREGATES, 2016, % 
 % 
Wage Bill 0.3 
Gross operating surplus 4.7 
Corporation Tax 2.5 
GDP 3.0 
GNI 0.2 
Depreciation 8.1 
Capital Stock, 2014 15.6 
 
Source:  www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-ali/aircraftleasinginireland2007-2016. 
 
IP and contract manufacturing 
The scalability of IP capital means that it can be, and has been, used to produce 
very large output of phones and computers. A second aspect of IP capital is that it 
can be exploited by workers (and physical capital) located in different 
jurisdictions than where the IP capital is itself located; it is separable from the 
other factors of production. This is very different from other capital, where the 
equipment has to be physically present in the country where the production 
takes place. 
 
While IP plays a very important role in many industries, the Information 
Technology (IT) sector appears to be unusual in the extent to which the IP is 
separated in terms of geographical jurisdiction from the related physical 
production. The pharmaceuticals sector, which is also an important part of the 
Irish economy, and where production is dominated by foreign MNEs, uses very 
extensive IP in producing its output. The IP is either located in Ireland, where the 
production takes place, or is licensed by the Irish subsidiary from the parent MNE, 
appearing as an import of services. Thus the IP in pharmaceuticals is more closely 
associated with where the goods themselves are actually produced. 
 
In the case of some key IT sector firms in Ireland, they have used contract 
manufacturing to undertake the production of their products, such as 
smartphones and computers. This contract manufacturing does not involve the 
transfer of the IP or the licensing of the IP to the contract manufacturer. As 
discussed in Section 4, this contrasts with the situation where a firm uses a 
subsidiary abroad, licensing the IP to that firm. 
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FIGURE 2 INVESTMENT IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS A % OF GDP 
 
 
Source:  Eurostat. 
 
Since the early 2000s, there has been extensive investment in intellectual 
property by foreign MNEs. Figure 2 shows investment in IP as a percentage of 
GDP for Ireland and the other EU countries where it is also important. In the case 
of Ireland this investment represented between 3 per cent and 4 per cent of GDP 
for much of the last decade, rising to 5 per cent in 2009. The vast bulk of this 
investment was not produced in Ireland but was imported. The investment in IP is 
being undertaken by foreign MNEs who choose to operate in Ireland through 
subsidiaries of their parent companies. 
 
The biggest shock to the Irish National Accounts in recent years has come from 
the once-off movement to Ireland in 2015 of IP owned by foreign MNEs. Because 
it was a relocation of the firms it did not show up in investment; instead the 
transfer shows up in the financial account of the Balance of Payments. This 
transfer of IP capital amounted to between €250 billion and €300 billion, 
increasing the domestic capital stock by 40 per cent in that year. The increase in 
the capital stock also amounted to over 100 per cent of Irish GNI.10 In addition to 
the transfer of ownership of IP, there has been major additional investment in IP 
in 2015 (10 per cent of GNI) and in 2016 (21 per cent of GNI), which is also 
reflected in services imports of IP. As a result, the capital stock rose by another 10 
per cent in 2016. 
 
                                                          
 
10  It also represented over 2 per cent of US GNI. 
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FIGURE 3 TRADE ON A NATIONAL ACCOUNTS AND TRADE STATISTICS BASIS, € MILLION 
 
 
Source:  National Income and Expenditure and Quarterly National Accounts and Trade Statistics. 
 
This movement of firms and their IP to Ireland was also associated with dramatic 
changes in the output recorded in the Irish National Accounts. The newly 
relocated firms used their IP located in Ireland in other countries, such as China, 
to produce IT products such as smartphones and computers. These operations 
were undertaken in the third countries on a contract basis rather than through a 
wholly owned subsidiary. The Asian firms undertaking the manufacture were paid 
a fee for the work, which covered the cost of the physical capital and the labour 
used in the production process. The difference between this payment to the firm 
manufacturing the goods and the value of the product produced (the profit on 
the goods), which embodied the parent firm’s IP, is then considered as output in 
Ireland. 
 
The fact that the actual manufacture took place in a third country and that the 
goods produced never pass through Ireland is irrelevant from the point of view of 
the National Accounts. What is crucial in determining where this output is located 
in the accounts is the ownership of the goods produced. If they had been 
produced by a subsidiary then the output, including the profit related to the IP, 
would have been located where the goods were physically produced. The profits 
would then have been remitted to the parent company, appearing as a factor 
flow in the National Accounts, but not in GDP. 
 
Instead, the profit of the company owning the IP, which is the ‘pure’ return on 
the firms’ IP, is treated as output in Ireland, and the full value of the goods 
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produced in the third country is treated as an export from Ireland in the National 
Accounts. This has seen a huge difference open up between the merchandise 
export figures on a trade statistics basis and the same item in the National 
Accounts (Figure 3). 
 
In the National Accounts the relocation of these firms to Ireland accounted for 
much of the very large increase in real GDP in 2015 of 26 per cent. Obviously this 
increase in the output of the foreign MNEs, which is primarily reflected in an 
increase in their profits, only benefits those living in Ireland to the extent that 
corporation tax is paid in Ireland on those profits.11 
 
GNI is arrived at by deducting the profits of the MNEs, after depreciation, as they 
are treated as being accrued to the foreign parent whether or not they are 
actually remitted in the year in question. However, because of the presence of 
these MNEs’ very large stock of IP in Ireland, from 2015 depreciation accounted 
for by large foreign MNEs jumped from under €6 billion in 2014 to €29 billion in 
2015 and €33 billion in 2016.12 This massive rise in depreciation in 2015 
accounted for much of the increase in GNI of around 16 per cent in that year. 
However, because the depreciation on the capital stock of foreign-owned MNEs 
does not benefit domestic residents, the resulting growth in GNI in no way 
reflects the change in welfare of Irish residents. 
 
GNI was used by policymakers as a good indicator of what was happening to 
domestic economic activity over the last 30 years. However, as a result of these 
changes, it is no longer fit for this purpose.  
 
As discussed later, to deal with this problem, the Irish Central Statistics Office 
(CSO) has introduced an ‘adjusted’ GNI, referred to as GNI*, which excludes the 
depreciation on foreign-owned IP and leased aircraft, and also makes an 
adjustment for the profits of redomiciled PLCs (CSO, 2017). Alternatively, Net 
National Income, which grew in nominal terms by around 10 per cent in 2015, 
would be an appropriate variable for domestic policymakers to target if it were 
also adjusted for the profits of redomiciled PLCs. However, in the case of both 
NNI and GNI* the CSO has not yet developed these series on a constant price 
basis.  
 
                                                          
 
11  Because Ireland’s contribution to the EU Budget is based on GNI, part of the increase in corporation tax was offset by 
an increase in the EU budgetary contribution. 
12  www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/newsevents/documents/seminars/globalisationinireland/Multinationals_in_the_ 
Institutional_Sector_Accounts_-_Peter_Culhane,_CSO.pdf. 
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While the effects of the large IP related activity of foreign MNEs on the output 
side of the National Accounts is confined to the gross operating surplus in the 
sectors where these companies operate, the effects on the expenditure side of 
the account are more complex. 
 
Investment in IP and aircraft for leasing accounts for a substantial share of total 
investment. The CSO publishes a figure for modified total domestic demand 
which excludes these components of investment. It gives a better picture of 
domestic demand of Irish residents. 
 
FIGURE 4 CURRENT ACCOUNT OF THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, % OF GNI 
 
 
Source: www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/in/acabi/amodifiedcurrentaccountbalanceforireland1998-2016. 
 
However, it can be very difficult to unscramble what is happening on trade: it is 
affected by the import of the IP and aircraft for leasing that are included in 
investment. There are also large amounts of contract manufacturing affecting 
both imports and exports. There are substantial services imports and exports in 
respect of the licensing of IP, and there is the repatriation of profits by foreign 
MNEs and the profits of redomiciled PLCs. This has made it very difficult to 
determine the contribution from trade with the outside world to domestic 
economic welfare. 
 
Because of the complexity of the relationship between the domestic economy 
and the rest of the world, much of which arises from the effects of a large foreign 
MNE presence, it is also difficult to interpret the current account of the Balance 
of Payments.  
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As discussed already, the activities of redomiciled PLCs have served to artificially 
boost the surplus (reduce the deficit) on the current account of the Balance of 
Payments in recent years. The massive increase in depreciation in 2015 on the IP 
of foreign MNEs in Ireland also greatly magnifies the surplus. The gross operating 
surplus of these foreign MNEs includes the depreciation. While the net operating 
surplus, after tax, flows back out in factor income, this is not the case for the 
depreciation. Instead the write down in the value of the assets in Ireland is 
reflected in the financial accounts of the Balance of Payments. As shown in Figure 
4, the effect of this relocation in 2015 was to produce a massive surplus on the 
current account reflecting the depreciation on the IP that relocated to Ireland. 
This makes the balance on the unadjusted current account useless for monitoring 
internal pressures in the Irish economy. 
 
To deal with this problem the CSO has issued an adjusted current account 
balance as shown in Figure 4. This excludes imports of aircraft for leasing, imports 
of IP, depreciation on these two items and the profits of redomiciled PLCs. This 
provides a more realistic picture of the balance between savings and investment 
in the Irish economy. However, further work may be needed before this is a fully 
appropriate indicator.13 In the next iteration the CSO will exclude exports of IP. 
 
Problem for policymakers 
The wide-ranging and complex effects of globalisation on the Irish National 
Accounts have made it very difficult for policymakers to understand what is really 
going on in the economy. During the recent crisis years the headline indicators of 
GDP and GNI, which are normally targeted by policymakers, were seriously 
distorted by the changing effects of globalisation on the economy. Today there 
are concerns as to how rapidly the economy may be approaching capacity. 
However, the problems with available national accounting data make it very 
difficult to assess the urgency with which corrective action should be taken. 
 
 
                                                          
 
13  Coffey (2017). http://economic-incentives.blogspot.ie/2017/10/the-current-account-where-do-we-stand.html. 
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TABLE 4 KEY NATIONAL ACCOUNTS AGGREGATES, GROWTH RATE NOMINAL AND REAL, % 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Current Prices 
GDP 6.6 -4.8 -9.4 -1.5 2.6 2.1 2.7 7.9 34.7 5.2 
GNI 5.1 -4.6 -12.5 -1.3 -0.6 2.7 6.8 8.3 24.9 9.9 
GNI* 5.1 -4.9 -13.6 -4.2 -1.0 1.3 7.5 8.0 11.9 9.4 
Constant Prices 
GDP 5.2 -3.9 -4.6 1.8 3.0 0.0 1.6 8.3 25.6 5.1 
GNI 3.5 -3.3 -7.6 3.3 -0.4 1.0 5.2 8.9 16.4 9.4 
 
Source: CSO: National Income and Expenditure, 2016. 
 
Table 4 shows the growth rate from 2007 for certain key aggregates in current 
and constant prices. (The adjusted GNI figure, GNI*, is not yet available in 
constant prices.) While GNI* in nominal terms is only a partial solution to the 
problems of interpretation arising from globalisation, it is a better guide to 
growth in the domestic economy than the more traditional measures of GDP and 
GNI. 
 
As shown in the Table, GNI* shows a markedly different path than GNI or GDP 
from 2010 onwards. At the height of the crisis in 2010 it suggests that the 
economy was performing worse than would have been understood using GNI or 
GDP. It also suggests that the robust recovery may have begun in 2013 rather 
than in the second half of 2012. Finally, it provides a picture of a more stable, but 
still very rapid, rate of growth between 2014 and 2016, in contrast to the 
unbelievable picture from GDP and GNI. However, even GNI* looks to be on the 
high side, given what has been happening on the labour market. 
 
Wider implications of developments in Ireland 
Obviously the problems in interpreting the National Accounts for Ireland, 
identified in this section, are of primary concern to Irish policymakers. However, 
some of the changes in 2015 are big enough to be noticeable in the accounts for 
other larger economies, such as the US. Guvenen, et al. (2017) have considered 
how US output may be under-recorded as a result of the operation of US MNEs 
that own large IP. Given the size of the relocation to Ireland in 2015, and the fact 
that the companies involved were almost certainly US based, the changes in key 
Irish aggregates can also usefully be considered in terms of how the US National 
Accounts might have been affected if the relocation had been to (or from) the US. 
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TABLE 5 CHANGES IN SOME KEY IRISH NATIONAL ACCOUNTS AGGREGATES, % OF IRISH AND 
US GDP 
 Ireland Ireland US Change in Ireland as % of 
 
2015, Change  
€ m 
2014  
€ m 
2014  
€ m Ireland US 
GDP 50,000 194,537 13,118,250 25.7 0.4 
Exports 66,075 219,786 1,786,676 30.1 3.7 
Depreciation 23,861 29,486 2,068,497 80.9 1.2 
 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
 
Table 5 gives an estimate of the change in Ireland in 2015 of nominal GDP, 
exports and depreciation as a result of the relocation to Ireland of companies 
with very large IP. The increase in output attributed to Ireland added almost 26 
per cent to nominal GDP. If the subsidiaries relocating to Ireland had instead 
relocated to the US it would have added 0.4 per cent to US GDP. 
 
Similarly, the increase in exports of goods produced on contract in Asia amounted 
to 30 per cent of Irish exports, and would have amounted to almost 4 per cent of 
US exports. Finally, the increase in depreciation added around 80 per cent to the 
Irish aggregate and the change was equivalent to 1.2 per cent of the relevant US 
aggregate.  
 
6. SOLUTIONS 
The difficulties caused by the process of globalisation for national accounting 
obviously differ from one country to another. However, many of the problems 
faced in accounting for the Irish economy are faced by other economies, albeit 
generally to a lesser extent. To meet the needs of users of National Accounts 
significant additions are needed to the current standard accounting framework. 
 
Both Eurostat and the CSO will, as the law requires, continue to produce the 
National Accounts on the SNA 2008/ESA 2010 basis. This means that the headline 
GDP figure will not be amended but will continue to be affected by the actions of 
MNEs that are resident in Ireland. However, while the law requires accounts to 
be produced on this basis, and these accounts must be used for certain 
administrative purposes in the EU, there is no restriction on the CSO (or Eurostat) 
from producing additional ‘satellite’ accounts, which could better meet the needs 
of most users of national accounting data.  
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In the case of Ireland, the CSO has already introduced a number of innovations 
dealing with some of the problems identified earlier in this paper. However, it 
would be beneficial for users of the Irish National Accounts if a comprehensive 
framework of satellite accounts could be developed that dealt with the aspects of 
the globalisation process that have already been identified as problematic for the 
standard accounting presentation. A range of suggestions is made in CSO, 2017.  
 
The supplementary accounts that are needed should have a number of 
characteristics: 
• Ideally they should be developed to meet the needs of all economies, to 
ensure transparency. 
• They should provide a consistent treatment of economic activity over time. 
Serious discontinuities can pose major problems for policymakers. 
• They should provide a good representation of the economic welfare of those 
living in a country. 
• It is important that they are publishable without infringing on the 
confidentiality of data on individual companies (and households). This is a 
problem for small economies like Ireland. The supplementary accounts need 
to be robust: possible future changes in location by MNEs (or domestic firms) 
should not prevent the continuing publication of the series on confidentiality 
grounds. 
• They should not be affected by changes by MNEs in the precise legal 
framework they use in the country where their goods or services are 
physically produced. 
• The supplementary accounts need to deal with the problems affecting both 
the National Accounts and the Balance of Payments 
 
There is unlikely to be a single framework of satellite accounts that will meet all 
these requirements. As the process of globalisation evolves, new problems will 
arise and new solutions will be needed.  
 
This paper first considers three minor adaptations of the existing framework 
which would be helpful. It then sets out a simple set of indicators that could 
usefully be developed to provide additional information for users. Finally it 
considers features of a more detailed disaggregation of the SNA 2008 accounts 
that would provide a satisfactory framework for understanding the Irish 
economy.  
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Adapting the current accounts 
As outlined above, the very extensive aircraft leasing business, which makes a 
small contribution to Irish GNI, greatly complicates some aspects of the National 
Accounts due to very large gross flows it generates. It is likely that the standard 
financial accounting treatment of this business may change in the coming years, 
with implications for the National Accounts. This would involve essentially 
treating this business as a financial sector enterprise. 
 
In the aircraft leasing business planes are provided to airlines under a legal 
agreement that is rather similar to a mortgage. The planes are financed by loans, 
with the planes themselves as collateral. In the case of mortgages on houses the 
investment in the housing and the stock of housing is recorded in the National 
Accounts in the country where the houses are located and used, not where the 
banks providing the finance reside. However, in the case of aircraft they are 
currently recorded in the accounts of the country where the leasing company is 
located.  
 
The possible change in financial accounting would see the aircraft recorded as the 
asset of the airline that is the lessee and the relationship with the leasing 
company would then be treated as a purely financial relationship. The fees 
received by the leasing company would be a service export from the country 
where the leasing company resides. This would eliminate the large investment, 
capital stock and depreciation from the Irish accounts, leaving the domestic value 
added by the leasing companies. 
 
In the case of foreign MNEs that produce goods or services in Ireland, all of their 
after-tax net operating surplus is accrued as a factor outflow in the year in which 
it is earned, irrespective of whether a dividend is paid to the parent company. If a 
similar treatment were applied to the redomiciled PLCs, with their retained 
profits being accrued as a factor outflow, this would remove another 
anachronism from the Irish National Accounts.  
 
Connolly (2018) suggests that some of the problems arising from the relocation of 
firms with a major stock of IP could be better handled in the long run if they were 
treated as financial enterprises; the ownership of the IP has been separated from 
its use and the owner in Ireland receives income in respect of this asset, just as an 
investment company receives income from its assets. As with a change in the 
treatment of the aircraft leasing companies, this could greatly simplify the 
National Accounts, especially of smaller economies such as Ireland where 
substantial IP is located. However, the downside is that at a global level it might 
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not adequately capture the key role that such IP plays in the global production 
process. It is a stock of capital that has been produced and must be located in 
some jurisdiction to be included in global measures. 
 
Additional indicators 
The CSO, as recommended in CSO, 2017, has introduced an adjusted GNI figure, 
referred to as GNI*, in its latest set of National Accounts. This measure adjusts 
GNI to exclude the depreciation of IP and leased aircraft and the retained profits 
of redomiciled PLCs. To date it is only available at current prices, which means 
that it cannot yet be used directly for fiscal policy purposes. 
 
While this indicator is potentially more useful than GNI, it could need further 
changes if globalisation affected the economy in new ways. For example, if the 
pharmaceutical sector were to fully separate its IP capital from production, and 
locate such IP in Ireland, this would need a further change in GNI*.  
 
GNI* is designed to mimic GNI as it is measured in many other countries. This 
should facilitate its use in Ireland for international comparisons. However, as it is 
a measure only used in Ireland it will not be universally understood. Thus the 
measure currently lacks transparency for international users. 
 
Even within the current ESA 2010 data, Net National Income (NNI) is less affected 
than GNI by the problems that surfaced with the Irish National Accounts for 2015. 
The bulk of the activity of the MNEs that shifted to Ireland is effectively excluded 
from these aggregates, including the huge effect on depreciation. This may make 
it more useful than GNI*, which only excludes some of the depreciation of foreign 
MNEs.  
 
However, NNI has, until now, only been available on a current price basis for 
Ireland, though the CSO plans to address this problem in future publications. In 
addition, it includes the retained profits of redomiciled PLCs. The exclusion of this 
latter item from NNI would produce a very useful variable for Ireland but, like 
GNI*, it would also not be well understood internationally. 
 
The other problem with NNI is that, while it is included in the standard 
framework of National Accounts, little attention is given to it internationally, 
making it much less useful for the purpose of international comparisons. Part of 
the problem may lie with the fact that, while the CSO has done detailed work on 
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measuring depreciation, many other jurisdictions have paid less attention to this 
issue: as a result, GNI and GDP are considered a more reliable indicator of 
economic activity internationally.  
 
The second essential indicator that is required is one for the balance on current 
account of the Balance of Payments. The two problems with the current measure 
for Ireland relate to the treatment of depreciation by foreign MNEs and 
redomiciled PLCs’ retained profits. The CSO has recently published an adjusted 
current account figure for the Balance of Payments which excludes these items. 
However, further work may be needed on this measure. In particular, if 
depreciation of some major foreign owned MNEs is excluded, should 
depreciation of other foreign MNEs be similarly treated? 
 
Satellite accounts 
The effects of globalisation on the Irish economy permeate many of the items of 
the National Accounts. This makes it very difficult to understand developments in 
the economic welfare of those living in Ireland or to establish the productive 
capacity of the Irish economy. Even if one or two high level indicators of growth 
are used, such as GNI* or NNI, it is still exceptionally difficult to understand 
where this growth is occurring in the economy. Detailed knowledge of what is 
happening in the economy is vital for economic policy; it was part of the original 
justification for developing National Accounts. 
 
Even before the latest difficulties with the Irish data, arising from relocation of IP, 
there were increasing problems in identifying where growth was arising in the 
Irish economy. While the foreign owned MNE sector contributes hugely to 
exports and industrial output, the sector also has massive imports and the very 
large profits from the sector flow back out of the economy. Thus, while the 
contribution of the MNE sector to the economy is undoubtedly very positive, it is 
difficult to identify just how much of the growth in the real economy in recent 
years has come from this sector and how much has come from domestic firms.  
 
It is essential for economic policy that satellite accounts are provided to the 
standard National Accounts, identifying the contribution of different sectors to 
growth. Here this report concentrates on the additional information needed on 
the output and income side of the accounts. 
 
Any new presentation of national accounting data must also ensure that 
confidential information on individual companies is not disclosed. This constraint 
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is important in determining the appropriate level of sectoral detail to present. If 
the sectoral breakdown is too fine then individual large companies may be easily 
identified. However, if there is inadequate sectoral detail it will be very difficult to 
understand what is driving change in the economy. While a particular level of 
sectoral disaggregation may be possible today without disclosing confidential 
information, new companies, or closure of existing companies, may make such a 
level of sectoral detail impossible in the future. Thus in choosing the appropriate 
level of sectoral disaggregation to use it should be robust to movement of 
companies in the future. 
 
In the latest release of their Institutional Sector Accounts the CSO gives separate 
details for foreign MNE firms covered by their ‘Large Cases Unit’. This shows the 
contribution of these firms to NNI – their wage bill and the corporation tax they 
pay. It also shows their depreciation and operating surplus. The CSO has also 
published data at current and constant prices on GVA arising in much of the 
foreign owned MNE sector and the rest of the economy at an aggregate level.14 
However, this release provides no information on either sectoral detail or on the 
breakdown between GOS, depreciation and the wage bill. The CSO has also 
derived experimental data on aggregate employment and wages in MNEs and the 
rest of the economy.  
 
If these published statistics were greatly expanded to give sectoral detail and if 
the coverage of foreign MNEs was consistent (and complete) across the different 
publications, it would give a much better picture of where output, which 
contributes to NNI, is arising in the economy.  
 
 
                                                          
 
14  www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/gvafm/grossvalueaddedforforeign-
ownedmultinationalenterprisesandothersectorsannualresultsfor2016. However, the coverage of MNEs is not 
complete so there may be some mismatch with the firms covered by the Large Cases Unit. 
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TABLE 6 ALTERNATIVE PRESENTATION 
  e.g. Manufacturing 
  Total Foreign Domestic 
Current prices GVA Factor cost    
 Gross operating surplus    
 Wages    
 Stock adjustment    
 Non-Product Taxes    
 GDP Basic prices    
 Corporation Tax    
 GNI in sector    
 Depreciation    
 NNI in Sector    
  Deflator    
Constant prices GVA Factor cost    
 Wages    
 Depreciation    
 National domestic product at factor cost    
 GVA Basic prices    
 Corporation Tax    
 GNI in sector    
 Depreciation    
 NNI in sector    
 
 
Set out in Table 6 is a proposed framework for expanding the accounts for the 
output side of the National Accounts to meet users’ needs. Ideally these data 
should be provided for each sector of the economy (e.g. manufacturing, 
distribution etc.) cross-classified by foreign MNEs and the rest of the economy. 
This detail is needed to understand where growth is occurring in the economy 
and to understand developments in key aggregates, such as productivity. 
 
For each sector, value added needs to be broken down into the wage bill, the net 
operating surplus, corporation tax and depreciation, and cross-classified by MNE 
and other (domestic) firms. The aggregate data for each sector are already 
available on this basis from Eurostat and the CSO. Some of the additional 
breakdown into MNE and ‘other’ is also available from Eurostat and the CSO. 
What would be needed would be to ensure that this breakdown by ownership 
was available for each sector where there was a mix of MNEs and other firms. If a 
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sector was predominantly accounted for by MNEs or else by ‘other’ (Irish owned) 
firms, then the breakdown would be unnecessary.15 
 
GNI arising in a sector would then be the sum of the GVA in the ‘Other’ 
domestically owned sub-sector and the wage bill, depreciation, and corporation 
tax paid by the MNE sector. NNI excludes depreciation so that for foreign MNEs 
NNI would be the wage bill plus the corporation tax paid. 
 
This breakdown, if applied on an annual basis would show the contribution to GNI 
and NNI from each sector of the economy. This would allow the growth in NNI to 
be decomposed both by the sector in which it occurs and also by whether it 
occurs in Irish owned firms or foreign MNEs.  
 
One issue, which has not been discussed earlier, is the treatment of factor 
inflows. Where there are large Irish MNEs with operations abroad, the profits of 
these MNEs are included in factor income. This treats the activity abroad by 
MNEs as an investment that is not related to its domestic output. While this may 
be appropriate for some MNEs, for MNEs who have developed substantial IP and 
use it to produce goods or services abroad, an additional presentation might 
prove useful.  
 
As discussed earlier, the result of the current national accounting treatment of 
such activity is that if a firm produces abroad through a subsidiary the profits will 
flow back to the owner of the IP as factor income. However, if the production 
abroad is done on contract, then the profits earned abroad are treated as part of 
the MNE’s domestic output and included in the relevant sector’s GVA. As 
discussed in Section 4, this difference in treatment leaves open the possibility of 
substantial discontinuities if an MNE changes the legal status of its operation in a 
third country. 
 
To avoid this problem of possible discontinuities, one approach would be to 
include the factor income of MNEs as part of their output in satellite accounts. 
Then sectoral output would be unchanged if a domestic MNE moved from 
contract manufacturing abroad to operating through a subsidiary. This would be 
especially relevant where the profits were earned as a result of using IP. Such a 
change could have a significant impact on the accounts not only of the US, but 
 
                                                          
 
15  It could also prove problematic to publish such data for confidentiality reasons if there were only one or two MNEs or 
‘other’ firms in a sector. 
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also of countries such as Germany, where many of their MNEs have very large 
production undertaken abroad by subsidiaries. However, this alternative 
presentation would not be appropriate for many uses to which National Accounts 
are put. Because it would include in sectoral output production in other countries 
using foreign labour and physical capital, it would not be appropriate for fiscal or 
monetary policy purposes. Nonetheless, it would be a useful addition in a set of 
satellite accounts. 
 
The attribution of profits from operations abroad would probably best be 
included in domestic output where these profits arise largely from the 
exploitation of the home country MNE’s IP. Guvenen et al. (2017) attempt such 
an exercise for the US. However, it is difficult for most businesses to separate out 
the return on IP from profit reflecting the return on use of physical capital, 
making such an approach difficult for many sectors. 
 
Alternative approaches to the expenditure side of the National Accounts 
The CSO currently produces a measure of ‘modified’ domestic demand which 
excludes investment in IP and aircraft for leasing. These forms of capital are 
excluded because they are almost all used to produce output outside Ireland. This 
modified variable provides a better picture of what is happening on domestic 
demand. 
 
However, to date, a suitable approach to trade and factor flows has not been 
established which can separate out the role of foreign MNEs and domestic firms. 
Without such separation between the activities of these two types of firms it is 
very difficult, using the expenditure side of the National Accounts, to establish 
the effects of trade on the economic welfare of those living in Ireland.  
 
As a result of globalisation, foreign MNEs affect the external sector of the 
economy through a multiplicity of different channels. They may simultaneously 
export goods and import materials for use in domestic production; license IP for 
use abroad; purchase IP abroad; provide services abroad; receive profits from 
subsidiaries abroad and remit profits to their head offices. While for the larger 
foreign MNEs the CSO captures good data on all of these transactions, it is a 
much more complex task to derive appropriate deflators and maintain 
consistency with the available data on output. 
 
In the past, much of the attention of those forecasting the economy has gone on 
the components of the expenditure side of the National Accounts. Thus the 
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problems in interpreting what is happening on the expenditure side of the 
accounts are particularly difficult for policymakers. For example, both the Central 
Bank of Ireland and the Irish Department of Finance only provide detailed 
estimates of current and expected future economic activity on an expenditure 
basis.  
 
A further problem with the trade data is that there are massive gross flows. In 
recent decades globalisation has seen production processes being broken up into 
multiple stages occurring in many countries. Thus the exports associated with the 
production of a car or a computer (including exports of parts) could end up being 
a multiple of the value of the final product. We have seen in the Irish input-
output tables how the true domestic value added associated with exports, 
especially of services, has fallen over time. 
 
This is not just an Irish problem. One approach suggested in Koopman et al., 
2014, Rojas-Romagosa and van der Horst, 2015 and Los et al., 2016, would use 
input-output information to try and derive the domestic value added content in 
gross exports. If the data were readily available on a timely basis this might be a 
useful approach. 
 
However, the detailed data needed to implement this approach are not available 
in a timely manner. If implemented it would involve using the latest available 
data to undertake the analysis but these data would, inevitably, be out of date. 
As we have seen in Ireland, there have been very rapid changes in the structure 
of the economy over time which could render such an approach unreliable. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Globalisation has changed the model that traditionally underpinned the National 
Accounts. Economic activity in one country is now linked to activity in other 
countries through many different channels. This interdependency of economic 
activity in different countries makes it difficult to identify the output of a 
particular country and to measure it appropriately. 
 
The revisions to the System of National Accounts (SNA 2008) have tried to 
capture the effects of this globalisation process in a comprehensive fashion. The 
inclusion of IP in the capital stock has a strong basis in economic theory. 
However, possibly because of the concentration on capturing the effects of 
globalisation in a comprehensive manner, the headline national accounting 
indicators now do not provide a useful guide for policymakers in countries such 
as Ireland. 
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In recent decades the growth of MNEs spanning the globe has driven a growing 
wedge between the output attributed to a country such as Ireland, measured by 
GDP, and the economic welfare of those living in a country, previously measured 
by GNI. While in the past GNI provided a good guide to the output and income 
available to those living in a country, this is no longer the case for Ireland because 
of the way globalisation has affected the behaviour of MNEs. The traditional 
indicators need significant adjustment to make them useful. 
 
Probably the biggest distortion to the Irish National Accounts has arisen as a 
result of the inclusion of IP in the capital stock. This meant that the relocation to 
Ireland in 2015 of companies with large IP had a dramatic effect on the National 
Accounts. The fact that IP capital is scalable, in the sense that it can be used to 
produce unlimited output, and the fact that it is separable from all the other 
factors of production and can be combined with capital and labour in many 
countries to produce output, means that it does not fit well into the framework 
of National Accounts for a single country. 
 
Also, the fact that the National Accounts treat activity undertaken by MNEs in 
third countries very differently depending on their legal structure in the third 
countries, can give rise to serious discontinuities if firms change that legal 
structure. 
 
To deal with these problems it will be necessary to develop satellite accounts that 
separate out the activities of MNEs in each sector of the economy. This will allow 
policymakers to identify where growth is occurring in the economy and the 
contribution to growth that is coming from different sectors. 
 
While the CSO has developed a headline indicator for the economic welfare of 
domestic residents, referred to as adjusted GNI or GNI*, this indicator could need 
further adjustment if there is a significant change in the population of foreign 
MNEs in Ireland.  
 
While developing national solutions to these problems can meet the needs of 
domestic policymakers, this is not ideal: it lacks transparency at an international 
level. Because the national accounting problems discussed in this paper are not 
unique to Ireland it would be better if there were some international co-
ordination of the development of the necessary satellite accounts to understand 
how individual economies are really behaving. 
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